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ARTICLES
THE DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY'S
PLACE IN THE FAMILY OF FIDUCIARY
RELATIONSHIPS
Karen E. Boxx*
I. INTRODUCTION
The durable power of attorney is a deceptively simple document
that allows one person to handle the affairs of an incapacitated
person without court supervision. It is merely an agency relation-
ship, established by a written document, that continues during the
principal's incapacity. The durable power of attorney has been in
widespread use only for about twenty-five years.1 It is very easy to
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington. I gratefully acknowledge the
invaluable assistance of Todd Maybrown, whose comments have vastly improved this article,
and of Professor Thomas R. Andrews, for his continuing support and guidance.
Virginia, by a statute enacted in 1954, was the first state to allow a power of attorney
to continue beyond the principal's incapacity, but the concept did not become widely accepted
in other states until the Uniform Law Commissioners enacted the Uniform Probate Code in
1969, which included durable power of attorney sections. See VA. CODEANN. § 11-9.2 (Michie
2001); UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-501 to -505 & prefatory note, 8 U.L.A. 418, 418-24 (1998)
(defining and explaining durable power of attorney); FRANCISJ. COLLIN, JR. ErAL., DRAFTING
THEDURABLEPOWEROFATrORNEY:ASYSTEMSAPPROACH 5 (1984) (noting adoption of durable
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draft, and its use escapes most court proceedings or even much need
for legal assistance. The durable power of attorney has therefore
kept a low profile until now, and any attention it is now receiving
focuses primarily on abuse of the document, an admittedly rare
occurrence.' However, the durable power of attorney has become
extremely widespread as an aging population faces increasing
likelihood of periods of disability and as life becomes more compli-
cated, requiring more formal arrangements to handle one's financial
affairs.
This quiet little document creates a unique fiduciary relationship
that is overdue for analysis. That analysis can begin to identify and
answer the many open questions about the nature of the relation-
ship and the scope of duties of an attorney-in-fact. Analysis of the
durable power of attorney can also shed light on the broader
question that has been open for centuries and is still vigorously
debated: what is the nature of a fiduciary?
The status of fiduciary is a well-recognized legal concept with a
long history,3 but nevertheless retains considerable ambiguity and
confusion in application. There are certain discrete categories of
fiduciaries-trustees, guardians, agents, executors-with corre-
sponding discrete lists of rights, duties, and remedies for breach of
duties. Courts have sometimes expanded the role of a fiduciary
beyond the traditional categories when circumstances indicate that
a person's relationship with another should impose a higher duty.
Examples of such relationships include priest or minister-parishio-
ner,4 employee-employer, insurance broker-insured, 6 stockbroker-
power of attorney statutes by various states occurred throughout 1970's and by 1983, all fifty
states had enacted such legislation); see also David M. English, The UPC and the New
Durable Powers, 27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 333, 337 (1992) (describing evolution and
acceptance of durable power of attorney statutes).
2 See E. Thomas Shilling, Report on ACTEC Elder Law Committee Questionnaire on
Possible Abuse of Financial Durable Power of Attorney, 21 AM. C. OFTR. &EST. COUN. NOTES
247, 247-50 (1995) (reporting results of durable power of attorney survey of members of
American College of Trust and Estate Counsel).
' See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 795 (1983) (noting "the
various types of fiduciaries have evolved over the centuries.").
' E.g., Nicholson v. Rose, 165 Cal. Rptr. 156, 159-60 (Ct. App. 1980) (stating minister
breached fiduciary duty to plaintiff where confidential relationship was present); Moses v.
Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 321-23 (Colo. 1993) (stating bishop's superior position and
power over plaintiff was sufficient to support finding of fiduciary relationship); Erickson v.
Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (noting clergy who abuse roles of pastor
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client7 and school-student.8 However, when expanding the defini-
tion of fiduciary, courts have adapted the consequences of that
characterization to fit the particular situation. The result is now a
patchwork, where the traditional categories are surrounded by
situational fiduciaries that borrow from an assortment of the
established rules to define the scope of that particular fiduciary's
duties.
Scholars have long discussed the consequences of the fiduciary
label and have tried, without arriving at consensus, to devise a
unifying principle or definition of the fiduciary. Much of the
discussion has focused on identifying the determining characteristic
that makes a relationship "fiduciary" in character. Recently the
debate has centered on the question of whether fiduciary duties are
merely implied contractual terms, subject to alteration by the
parties, or whether fiduciary status is a category separate from
contractual relationships.9 The purpose of the discussion is not
merely descriptive, but is also intended to aid courts in identifying
when the heightened duties and stiffer remedies applicable to
fiduciaries are justified.
The attorney-in-fact presents a fresh example to use in examin-
ing these core concepts because the relationship generally arises in
a non-commercial setting and incorporates an unusual level of
and counselor can be held liable for breach of 'confidential relationship," analogous to
fiduciary relationship). But see Langford v. Diocese of Brooklyn, 677 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438-39
(Sup. Ct. 1998) (stating First Amendment Free Exercise clause precluded examination of
fiduciary relationship between priest and parishioner). See generally Janice D. Villiers,
Clergy MalpracticeRevisited. LiabilityforSexualMisconduct in the CounselingRelationship,
74 DENV. U. L. Rzv. 1, 37-50 (1996) (arguing clergy-counselee relationship should be deemed
fiduciary relationship as matter of law); Lindsey Rosen, Constitutional Law--In Bad Faith"
Breach of Fiduciary Duty by the Clergy-F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997), 71
TEMP. L. REV. 743, 745 (1998) (arguing fiduciary relationship should apply to clergy and free
exercise clause may not always serve as barrier to liability).
' E.g., Sara Lee Corp. v. Carter, 519 S.E.2d 308, 312-13 (N.C. 1999) (stating employee
had fiduciary duty to employer).
6 E.g., Moss v. Appel, 718 So. 2d 199, 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (stating insurance
broker is in fiduciary relationship with insured).
' E.g., Pace v. McEwen, 574 S.W.2d 792, 796 (Tex. App. 1978) (stating fiduciary
relationship existed between stockbroker and his client).
B E.g., Schneider v. Plymouth State CoIL, 744 A.2d 101, 105 (N.H. 1999) (stating
relationship between post-secondary institution and its students is fiduciary in context of
sexual harassment by faculty members).
9 See infra notes 163-231 and accompanying text.
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discretion. Fitting the attorney-in-fact into this broader discussion
not only advances our thinking about the fiduciary principle, but
also helps to bring much needed precision to the attorney-in-fact's
defined role.
Part II of this Article will describe the evolution of the durable
power of attorney.1" Part III will summarize general fiduciary
principles and their application in both traditional fiduciary roles
and fact-based fiduciary settings.1' The precise nature of the
fiduciary relationship is subject to considerable debate; that debate
is also described in Part III. Part IV discusses how the durable
power of attorney, a example of a fiduciary relationship not
previously considered in the theoretical debate, illuminates the
general discussion. 2 Finally, Part V applies fiduciary principles to
the durable power of attorney and points out the numerous
ambiguities regarding the attorney-in-fact's duties. This section
then makes recommendations to clarify the scope of those duties in
order to serve purposes of both curbing abuse of powers of attorney
and making them more useful."3
II. HISTORY OF THE DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY
The power of attorney is simply a written instrument used by a
principal to appoint an agent to act on the principal's behalf.'4 The
common law principles of agency therefore govern powers of
attorney, and since the term attorney-in-fact means an agent
appointed via a power of attorney,16 the attorney-in-fact's duties are
determined under the laws of agency.' 6 At common law, the agency
10 See infra notes 14-84 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 85-214 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 215-31 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 232-335 and accompanying text.
14 1 FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 35, at 19 (2d ed. 1914)
("when the [agent's] authority is conferred by formal instrument in writing, it is said to be
conferred by 'letter of attorney,' or, more commonly by 'power of attorney.' ") (citation
omitted). Agency relationships may also be created orally. Brown v. Poulos, 411 N.E.2d 712,
714-15 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 26 (1958).
15 1 MECHEM, supra note 14, at 19 ("When the authority is conferred by power of
attorney, the agent is frequently called an 'attorney,' or more commonly, an 'attorney in fact,'
in order to distinguish him from the attorney at law.").
16 William M. McGovern, Jr., Trusts, Custodianships, and Durable Powers of Attorney,
[Vol. 36:1
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relationship and the agent's authority to act terminated on the
death or incapacity of the principal. 7 The principal's incapacity
automatically terminated the agency because of the assumption that
an agent acts at the direction of the principal 8 and the principal has
the power to terminate the agency at any time.' 9 The principal's
incapacity would remove both of those essential elements of the
relationship. 0
The common law power of attorney was therefore useless as a
tool for disability planning.2' Prior to the introduction of the
durable power of attorney, the legal means of handling an incompe-
tent person's affairs were limited to guardianship proceedings, trust
arrangements and other limited private arrangements such as
representative payees for Social Security benefits22 and joint
tenancy bank accounts. 2' However, guardianships are cumbersome,
intrusive and expensive, and the other types of arrangements are
generally limited in the scope of assets that can be managed.
25
27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 20 (1992).
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 122, 133 (1958); Warren A. Seavey, The
Rationale of Agency, 29 YALE L.J. 859, 893 (1920).18 Seavey, supra note 17, at 863.
19 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 118 (1958).
o See Davis v. Lane, 10 N.H. 156, 158-59 (1839) (holding insanity or incapacity of
principal serves as revocation of authority ofagent); Maj. MichaelM. Schmitt & Capt. Steven
A. Hatfield, The Durable Power of Attorney: Applications and Limitations, 132 MIL. L. REV.
203, 204 (1991) C([B]ecause the principal was no longer able to oversee the actions of his
agent, a continued agency relationship was imprudent.").
21 The terms disability, incompetence, and incapacity will be used interchangeably in this
article to mean inability to manage one's affairs, although their precise definitions vary.
' Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1383(a) (1994 & Supp. 1999).
23 See NAT'L COUNCIL ON AGING, GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR OLDER
PEOPLE 55-57 (1963) [hereinafter 1963 COUNCIL ON AGING REPORT] (discussing options for
financial management of incapacitated persons).
24 See Ralph M. Engel, Estate Planning for the Handicapped, Part IV, Alternatives to
Incompetency Proceedings orlf You're Going toBecome Incompetent, You'd BetterBeRich, 111
TR. & EST. 782, 782 (1972) (noting proceeding establishing guardianship would cost at least
$10,00 0in 1972, which would not include costs ofmaintaining guardianship); William S. Huff,
The Power of Attorney-Durable and Nondurable Boon or Trap?, in 11 INST. ON EST. PLAN.
ch. 3 300 (Philip E. Heckerling ed., 1997) (noting "many features of court appointed
guardianship may make it unattractive prospect').
' For example, representative payee status covers only social security benefits, andjoint
tenancy designations would have to be made for each of the incapacitated person's assets in
order to be comprehensive. That may not be possible if the incapacitated person owns an
asset that is not conducive to joint tenancy form. See JESSE DUKEMNIER & STANLEY
JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES 350 (6th ed. 2000) (noting joint tenancy would create
6 GEORGIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 36:1
Virginia enacted the prototype for durable powers of attorney in
1954.26 The Virginia statute provided that if the document creating
the power of attorney stated that the agent's power continued after
the principal became incapacitated, then the agent's power did not
terminate on the incapacity of the principal."
The idea did not receive national consideration, however, until
the plight of the elderly and incapacitated became the subject of
national study by the American Bar Foundation,28 the National
Council on the Aging,29 and the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws8" in the late 1950's and early 1960's.
Those studies found that state laws gave few viable provisions for
management of the financial affairs of mentally incapacitated
adults.31 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
presumption overriding incapacitated person's will, or right of his or her heirs to inherit via
intestacy, and give property to surviving joint tenant upon death of incapacitated person).
The other heirs may be able to rebut the presumption of survivorship rights depending on the
state statute in force. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 30.22.100(3) (West 1986 & Supp.
2001) (describing ownership of funds after death of depositor). However, where the principal
only wants to appoint someone to care for the principal's needs in the event the principal
becomes incapacitated, but does not want to leave all remaining property to that caretaker
upon the principal's death, the survivorship feature makes joint tenancy an undesirable
method of disability planning. Trust arrangements can, in most cases, handle all of the
incapacitated person's financial affairs, if properly funded. However, they cannot address
many personal matters, such as health care, and are perceived as very expensive. See 1963
COUNCIL ON AGING REPORT, supra note 23, at 56 ("[A trust] is not practical, however, unless
the assets are of considerable value.").
' 1954 Va. Acts ch. 486 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 11-9.1 (Michie 2001)).
27 Id.
2 AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (Donald M.
McIntyre, Jr. & Frank T. Lindman eds., 1961) [hereinafter ABA REPORT].
9 1963 COUNCIL ON AGING REPORT, supra note 23, at 55-57.
0 NATL CONFERENCE OF COMM'S ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWSAND PROCEEDINGS OFTHEANNUAL
CONFERENCEMEETINGINITS SEVENTY-THIRDYEAR, 273 (1964) [hereinafter 1964 HANDBOOK].
The National Law Commissioners created the Special Committee on the Civil Rights of
Persons of Questionable Competency in 1957, at the request of the ABA Real Property,
Probate and Trust section. The ABA section was responding to problems addressed in two
papers that had been presented to the section, whose titles indicate the perceived problems:
"A VACUUM IN OUR LAW: MANAGEMENT OF PROPERTY OF QUASI-INCOMPETENT PERSONS," and
"THE NOT-QUITE INCOMPETENT INCOMPETENT." Id. Both papers concluded that most state
laws did not provide adequate methods for assisting marginally incapacitated persons with
their financial affairs. Id.
31 For example, the National Council on Aging study concluded that different aged
persons' difficulties with financial management was a matter of degree, but the legal solutions
used an either-or approach. 1963 COUNCILONAGINGREPORTsupra note 23, at 10. Similarly,
the ABA study concluded that state laws governing property rights of the mentally disabled
DURABLE POWERS OFATTORNEY
State Laws responded to the studies with a rather modest proposal:
the Model Special Power of Attorney for Small Property Interests
Act (the "Model Act"). 2 The prefatory note to this Act states that
the National Conference of Commissioners had determined that its
committee was "relieved of its original obligation to undertake the
drafting of comprehensive legislation,""3 because of the activities of
other groups, and that the committee instead focused on creating a
power of attorney that could be used for assisting the mentally
disabled. 4 The prefatory note further stated that:
[t]he purpose of this model Special Power of Attorney
Act is primarily to provide a simple and inexpensive
legal procedure for the assistance of persons with
relatively small property interests, whose incomes are
small, such as pensions or social security payments,
and who, in anticipation or because of physical
handicap or infirmity resulting from injury, old age,
senility, blindness, disease or other related or similar
causes, wish to make provision for the care of their
personal or property rights or interests, or both when
unable adequately to take care of their own affairs. It
is not contemplated that a power of attorney executed
under this Act will be used for the general handling
of sizable commercial property interests. Neither is
it intended wholly to replace conservatorship or
guardianship, but rather it is designed as a less
expensive alternative. 5
This proposal contained restrictive provisions that illustrate the
tentative attitude of the drafting committee. First, in order to be
enforceable as a durable power, that is, one that would be unaffected
were unclear and recommended that limitations on financial dealings of incapacitated persons
should be a matter of degree, related to the extent and nature of the disability. ABAREPORT,
supra note 28, at 272.
1964 HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 275.
Id. at 273.
Id.
Id. at 274.
2001]
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by the principal's incapacity, it had to be signed before a judge who
approved the document.86 The comments to the Act express the
quaint hope that the principal would be known to the judge who was
asked to approve the power of attorney."7 Second, the power of
attorney had to state the annual income and the nature and extent
of any property that would be affected by the power, 8 and had to be
filed with the court clerk and recorded in the principal's county of
residence and in each county where affected real property was
located.3" Finally, the property affected by a power of attorney had
to be less than a certain "relatively small" amount.4" The Model Act
left the actual amounts blank, to be set by the individual state
legislatures,41 but the comments stated that "in order to keep the
procedures under the Act simple and inexpensive so as best to serve
the interests of those for whose benefit the Act is primarily de-
signed, it was found necessary to restrict the property value and the
annual income to be covered by the Act to relatively small amounts,
within the judgment of each state legislature adopting the Act."42
The power of attorney would terminate if the value of the property
subject to the power of attorney grew to exceed the permissible
amounts.4" None of these restrictions were retained in the later
versions of the durable power of attorney provisions adopted by the
Uniform Law Commissioners or in the versions of the later uniform
laws adopted by individual states.44
The Model Act also included provisions that required the
attorney-in-fact to account to the principal or the principal's legal
representative if the power of attorney required such accountings or
36 Id. at 275.
37 Id.
- Id. at 276.
9 Id. at 277.
40 Id.
"' The states that adopted the Model Act filled in the blank with amounts ranging from
$3,000 to $60,000 or property that produced annual income ranging from $2,400 to $10,000,
except for North Dakota, which did not limit amounts. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-68-301 to -313
(Michie 1987); Act of July 17, 1974, ch. 452, 59 Del. Laws 1544 (1973) (repealed 1982); Act of
Mar. 18, 1971, ch. 582, 1971 N.D. Laws 1243 (repealed 1973); Act of June 16, 1965, ch. 217,
1965 Okla. Sess. Laws 381 (repealed 1974); Act of Mar. 4, 1965, ch. 187, 1965 Wyo. Sees. Laws
481 (repealed 1985).
42 1964 HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 277.
4' Id. at 278.
" See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-501 to -505, 8 U.L.A. 419, 419-24 (1998).
[Vol. 36:1
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if the judge who approved the power directed an accounting, and
upon termination of the attorney-in-fact's authority.45 The Model
Act also gave three alternative standards of liability of the attorney-
in-fact. 41 One version would only hold the attorney-in-fact liable for
intentional wrongdoing or fraud, the second would hold a compen-
sated attorney-in-fact to the standards of other fiduciaries, and the
third version would hold any attorney-in-fact to the standard of care
applicable to other fiduciaries, unless the document provided
otherwise.4" The alternatives were offeredbecause the Commission-
ers could not agree on this issue. Those who wanted to limit
liability assumed that in most cases the attorney-in-fact would be a
family member serving without compensation and that such a
person should be subject only to very limited liability.4" Again, the
later versions of the durable power of attorney statute adopted by
the Uniform Law Commissioners did not contain these protective
provisions,49 but comparable provisions exist in some state power of
attorney statutes.50
The limitations and timidity of the initial proposal are significant
for the purpose of discussing the scope of an attorney-in-fact's
fiduciary duty. They illustrate that the initial idea of a durable
power of attorney, extending authority into a principal's incapacity,
would not have needed to redefine the fiduciary duty of such an
agent, since the amounts were to be limited and the original
proposal included some judicial oversight. In fact, the comments to
the first Model Act state that if the durable power of attorney was
extended to include unlimited amounts of property, then "extensive
safeguards and more detailed and complicated procedures with
attendant increased expenses"51 would be necessary, and that
45 1964 HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 280.
48 Id. at 279.
47 Id.
48 Id.
'9 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-501 to -505, 8 U.L-L 419, 419-24 (1998 & Supp. 2001)
(failing to include protective provisions).
' See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 4231 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001) (outlining standard of care
for attorney-in-fact); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-11(b) (1999) (requiring accountings to be filed
with court once principal becomes incapacitated); OKLA. STAT. tit. 58 § 1081 (1991) (outlining
same standard of care for attorney-in-fact as for other fiduciaries).
" 1964 HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 277.
2001]
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extension would defeat the purpose of the Act, which was to provide
an inexpensive alternative to guardianship for persons of modest
means.52 It is interesting to note, however, that at least some of the
drafters thought that a person acting under a durable power of
attorney should be held to the same standard as "other
fiduciaries,""3 and that an alternative section requiring that
standard was included in the Model Act.54
The Model Act received little attention,55 and the concept of a
durable power of attorney did not receive widespread acceptance
until the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) in 1969,
which included a provision allowing powers of attorney to continue
after the incapacity of the principal. 6 The durable power of
attorney provision appeared in early drafts of the legislation,57 and
the provision that was included in the final draft was, according to
the comments, modeled on the Virginia statute. 8 It therefore was
very brief, consisting of just one section,59 and did not include the
protections and limitations contained in the Model Act.6" In fact, the
52 Id. at 274, 277.
53 See id. at 279, 280 (discussing variances in fiduciary duty). The comments to this
section rephrase the liability as "full fiduciary liability" without identifying the type of
fiduciary or whether the general fiduciary duty of an agent would be extended in this case to
the more extensive fiduciary duties of a trustee or guardian. Id.
I d.
Only Arkansas, Delaware, North Dakota, Oklahoma and Wyoming adopted the Model
Act. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-68-301 to -313 (Michie 1987); Act of July 17, 1974, ch. 452, 59 Del.
Laws 1544 (1973) (repealed 1982); Act of Mar. 18, 1971 ch. 582, 1971 N.D. Laws 1243
(repealed 1973); Act ofJune 16, 1965, ch. 217, 1965 Okla. Sess. Laws 381 (repealed 1974); Act
of Mar. 4, 1965, ch. 187, 1965 Wyo. Sess. Laws 481 (repealed 1985). See ARK. CODE ANN. §§
28-68-201 to -203 (Michie 1987) (retaining more limited Model Act provision and adopting
provisions similar to Uniform Probate Code discussed infra at notes 64-65 and accompanying
text).
5 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-501, 8 U.L.A. 419, 419 (1998).
57 See, e.g., NATL CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAws, UNIF. PROBATE CODE
WORKING DRAFT NUMBER 3 § 5-301, 15,266 (1967) [hereinafter WORKING DRAFT 3]
(illustrating early version of durable power of attorney provision).
53 NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIF. PROBATE CODEWORKING
DRAFT NUMBER 5 at 242-43 (1969) [hereinafter WORKING DRAFT 5].
59 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-502,8 U.L.A. 420,420 (1998) (including another section
thatprovided for continued authority of agent under either durable or nondurable power until
agent had actual knowledge of incapacity or death of principal). The purpose of that section
was to adopt the civil law rule, applicable to both durable and common law powers of
attorney, that actual knowledge of an event terminating the agents authority was necessary.
Id.
' See Richard V. Wellman, Some Effects of the Uniform Probate Code on Estate Planning,
2001] DURABLE POWERS OFATTORNEY
UPC provision was criticized by the California Bar for not requiring
more formality of execution.6' The official comments to the UPC do
not state why the drafters used the abbreviated Virginia form rather
than the Model Act's approach, but the statement of purpose for the
section indicates that the drafters were ready to make the device
available for a broad constituency as an economic alternative to
guardianship." Commentators have suggested that the streamlin-
ing of the durable power of attorney was intended to increase its
"practical utility" in order to "encourage widespread use of the
device."6
The UPC provision altered the common law rule of automatic
revocation upon incapacity of the principal and provided that the
agent's authority could continue under a power of attorney only if
the document contained the words: "This power of attorney shall
not be affected by disability of the principal," or similar words
indicating the principal's intent that the authority continue.64 The
provision also provided that if a conservator was later appointed for
the principal, then the attorney-in-fact would account to the
conservator rather than the principal, and the conservator would
in 4 INST. ON EST. PLAN. ch. 70 70.1900 (Philip E. Heckerling ed., 1970) (noting UPC
drafters began project in 1962, and were separate committee from the Model Act drafters).
This may explain why the UPC makes no reference to the Model Act.
61 STATE BAR OF CAL., THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE: ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE 182 (Mar.
1973) 'The concept of a power of attorney that would not be affected by disability, as provided
under UPC 5-501, has a great deal of merit, although some consideration might be given to
requiring the power to be notarized or witnessed to impress the principal with the
extensiveness of the power and authority being granted.").
' "It should be emphasized that the Article [Article V, 'Protection of Persons under
Disability and Their Property,' which includes guardianship and conservatorship provisions
as well as the durable power of attorney provision] contains many provisions designed to
minimize or avoid the necessity of guardianship and protective proceedings, as well as
provisions designed to simplify and minimize arrangements which become necessary for care
of persons or their property. The power of attorney which confers authority notwithstanding
later incompetence is one example of the former." UNIFORM PROBATE CODE: OFFICiAL TEXT
WITH COMMENTS art. 5 general cmt. (1971). The UPC drafters, unlike the ModelAct drafters,
were therefore concerned with the entire system of guardianships and alternatives and had
an overall goal of minimizing use of the formal court procedures and simplifying them as
much as possible.
63 JONATHAN FEDERMAN & MEG REED, ABUSE AND THE DURABLE POWER OF ATrORNEY:
OPTIONS FOR REFORM 14 (1994) ("Ultimately, this was the beginning of what has become a
legislative tendency to make the power of attorney easier to use.!).
" UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-501,8 U.L.A 419,419 (1998).
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have the power to revoke the power of attorney.65 The UPC
provision gave no other details, however, on the operation of a
durable power of attorney.
Upon adoption of the UPC, individual states began to accept the
concept and adopt comparable provisions.66 By 1984, all states and
the District of Columbia had enacted durable power of attorney
provisions, and the document has now become a staple ingredient
of estate plans.67
The simplicity and ease of use of the durable power of attorney,
the lack of restrictions and limitations on its use, and the inclusion
of statutory provisions protecting third parties, such as banks and
other financial institutions, when accepting durable powers of
attorney" led to increasing use of the document. That expansion in
turn led to increased instances of abuse, where an attorney-in-fact
would use his or her authority to misappropriate the principal's
property. The power of attorney's greatest advantage, its ease of use
and informality, is also its greatest flaw since it becomes easy to
abuse in the hands of a dishonest person. Articles appeared in the
press, detailing stories of dishonest attorneys-in-fact,69 and by the
6 Id.
' See Rene A. Wormser et al., Planning for the Protection of Incompetents, Young and
Old, in 6 INST. ON EST. PLAN. ch. 72 $$ 72.1500, 72.1507 (Philip E. Heckerling ed., 1972)
(noting transcript of panel discussion of estate planning experts in 1972 discussed powers of
attorney without acknowledging concept of durable powers). By 1977, an article noted that
thirty-three states had enacted either the UPC provisions or other statutory authority for
durable powers of attorney. Huf, supra note 24, $ 311. By 1981, forty-two states had durable
power of attorney legislation, and by 1983, all fifty states authorized durable powers of
attorney. COLLIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 5. The District of Columbia was the last hold-out,
but passed durable power of attorney legislation in 1987. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2081 (1997).
6 See FEDERMAN & REED, supra note 63, at 1 (calling durable power of attorney "very
popular estate planning tool"); Carolyn Dessin, Acting as Agent under a Financial Durable
Power of Attorney: An Unscripted Role, 75 NEB. L. REV. 574, 584 (1996).
' See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 404.719 (West 2001) (indicating third parties acting in good
faith may rely on any power of attorney executed by principal); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 487
(Vernon Supp. 2001) (noting when durable power of attorney is used, third party who relies
in good faith on acts of attorney within scope of power of attorney is not liable to agent).
Third party acceptance is critical to the durable power of attorney's usefulness, because under
most state statutes there is no mechanism to force a third party to accept the authority of an
attorney-in-fact. McGovern, supra note 16, at 39; cf. CAL. PROB. CODE § 4541(f) (West 1991
& Supp. 2001) (allowing attorney-in-fact to ask court to compel third party acceptance).
' See, e.g., Michael Sacks, Quick Orphan's Court Action Recovers Estate Funds, PENN.
L. WKLY., Oct. 27, 1997, at 1; Marvin Greene, Man Charged with Bilking Woman, 83, Out of
$6,000, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Oct. 2, 1991, at 4B; Jim Burns, Protecting the
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early 1990's, studies began to be conducted investigating the
frequency and severity of abuse.7" Although the general response
was that abuse was unusual when compared to the frequency of use
of durable powers of attorney without problems,7' commentators
began to discuss the possibility of abuse as a planning consideration
as well as a consideration for legislative reform.72
Later in the 1990's, elder abuse in general became a prominent
concern, 73 and legislatures responded with a variety of statutory
penalties.74 Because the durable power of attorney was sometimes
a method of financial abuse, some states adopted provisions that
would impose enhanced penalties when a durable power of attorney
is abused, and other states adopted significant oversight mecha-
Elderly: Cases of FinancialAbuse Against Senior Citizens AreRisingDramatically But There
Are Ways to Fight Back, L.A. TIMES, Valley ed., Dec. 11, 1992, at 25, available at 1992 WL
2826975; Jury Indicts Secretary on Charges of Stealing from Elderly Man, HOUSTON CHRON.,
June 20, 1992, at A28, available at 1992 WL 8072589; Tillie Fong, Memories of Lifetime
Disoppear-95 Year Old Finds Power of Attorney May Have Given Triend' the Right to Rob,
ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Nov. 13, 1995, at 4A, available at 1995 WL 10617357; Liza N. Burby,
Financial Abuse of the Elderly Spreads, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1994, at 4B.
70 See, e.g., Shilling, supra note 2, at 247-50 (reporting on survey results of members of
American College of Trust and Estate Counsel); David M. English & Kimberly K. Wolff
Survey Results Use of Durable Powers, PROB. & PROP., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 33 (surveying
members of ABA Real Property, Probate and Trust Law section); FEDERMAN & REED, supra
note 63, at 1-3 (reporting survey by Government Law Center of Albany Law School, which
included responses from attorneys, social service providers, district attorneys and judges, and
employees of area agencies on aging).
71 Schilling, supra note 2, at 248, 250.
712 See Mark E. Zumdahl, PreventingPower of Attorney Abuses, ILL. BAR. J., Oct. 1995, at
537 (describing ways to prevent abuse); see generally Nina Santo, Breaking the Silence:
Strategies for CombatingElderAbusein California, 31MCGEORGEL.REV. 801,828-29(2000);
Carolyn L. Dessin, Financial Abuse of the Elderly, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 203, 222-26 (2000)
[hereinafter, Dessin, Financial Abuse].
73 In 1981, the House Select Committee on Aging released a report calling elder abuse
a "hidden problem" and calling for protective services to prevent and treat elder abuse.
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING, 97TH CONG., ELDER ABUSE: AN EXAMINATION OF A
HIDDENPROBLEM (Comm. Print 1981). In 1990, a follow-up study on the response to the 1981
study was issued. Elder Abuse: A Decade of Shame and Inaction: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health and Long-Term Care of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 101st Cong.
(1990).
74 E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 74.34 (West 2001) (providing for vulnerable adult civil
protection proceedings); see Timothy H. Barron, Financial Exploitation of the Infirm Elderly:
A Delaware Perspective, 18 DEL. LAW. at 12 (Spr. 2000) (describing Delaware legislation
criminalizing financial exploitation of vulnerable adults).
's E.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/16-1.3(a)-(c) (West 1992 & Supp. 2001) (imposing
criminal penalties).
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nisms. 6 The Arizona durable power of attorney statute is an
extreme example of this trend; revised in 1998, the potential
penalties for misuse are now so foreboding that some practitioners
are advising clients to use revocable trusts rather than powers of
attorney for disability planning." For example, unless the benefits
are specifically identified in detail within the power of attorney or
within a written contract, an agent cannot receive any benefits from
the principal. 8 Otherwise, the agent could be subject to criminal
prosecution."9 The agent could also be subject to the penalty
provisions of Arizona's slayer statute, which authorize the loss of the
agent's right to inherit assets or property from the principal and
permits the recovery of treble damages and attorneys' fees against
the agent.8" In addition, the new provisions increase the execution
formalities for durable powers of attorney,"l and make it easier to
challenge the principal's capacity when signing the power of
attorney.
82
Currently, the durable power of attorney enjoys a well-estab-
lished position as an efficient estate planning tool,83 garnering little
attention from the courts, but receiving a certain amount of
criticism and constriction from state legislatures and others who are
on the front lines battling elder abuse. The durable power of
attorney was originally designed to meet the need for economical
disability planning, which is much greater now than when it was
originally proposed. However, its usefulness is threatened by well-
meaning proposals intended to curb abuse.84
16 E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506:7 (1997) (allowing interested persons to petition court
for oversight of attorney-in-fact).
" Thomas J. Murphy, Drafting Durable Powers of Attorney to Comply with the New
Legislative Changes, ARIZ. ATI'Y, Dec. 1998, at 22, 23.
78 ARiz. REV. STAT. § 14-5506(B) (1995).
79 Id. § 14-5506(A).
80 Id. §§ 46-456(C)-(E).
81 See id. § 14-5501(d) (enumerating requirements written powers of attorney must
satisfy).
8 See id. § 14-5506(d) (requiring witness to attest principal willingly signed power of
attorney); see Murphy, supra note 77, at 23 (discussing changes in burden of proving
principal's incapacity at time of execution).
' See, e.g., Schmitt & Hatfield, supra note 20, at 230 (concluding for military members,
who are relatively young and therefore more likely in short term to become disabled rather
than to die, "the durable power of attorney actually may be more useful than a will").
' See John J. Lombard, Jr., Planning for Disability, Health Care Issues and Develop-
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III. SUMMARY OF FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES
AND CATEGORIES
Analysis of the attorney-in-fact's role, which is clearly fiduciary,85
must start with general fiduciary principles. A clear characteriza-
tion of fiduciary obligation is elusive and its exact nature is much
debated. 6 Review of settled (and unsettled) principles of fiduciary
law, as well as their application to the durable power of attorney,
will assist decisions on how to define the attorney-in-fact's role and
shed new light on the essence of the fiduciary.
This section will begin by setting forth what is well-established
as general fiduciary law, and will then describe the application of
that law to the traditional sub-classes of fiduciaries, such as
trustees and agents. Next, this section will describe the "situational
fiduciary," where courts have expanded the fiduciary principle to
include nontraditional settings. Finally, this section will briefly
describe the controversy regarding the underpinnings and proper
theoretical characterization of the fiduciary principle.
A. SUMMARY OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES
Fiduciary rules consider the following two issues: how to identify
a fiduciary, and the consequences that flow from being classified as
a fiduciary.87 As to the first question, Professor Bogert defines a
fiduciary relationship as "one in which the law demands of one party
ments in Assisted Suicide, in 32 INST. ONEST. PLAN. ch. 18 1800, 1802.5 (Tina Portuondo
ed., 1998) (arguing statutory changes aimed at abuse make durable powers of attorney harder
to use, "do little to address the underlying dishonesty of certain members of the human race
who would not be deterred by more stringent requirements," and instead, existing criminal
penalties for theft and civil remedies, together with education of attorneys-in-fact, should be
used).
' See Schock v. Nash, 732 A.2d 217, 224-25 (Del. 1999) ("The creation of a power of
attorney imposes the fiduciary duty of loyalty on the attorney-in-fact.").
' See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 923 ("Fiduciary obligation has a number of characteristics that classify
it among the law's most exotic species").
' Professor DeMott inquired "First, in what circumstances does fiduciary obligation
apply? Second, what does the obligation require a person to do?" DeMott, supra note 86, at
882. See also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943) C'Tlo say that a man is a
fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a
fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciaryT).
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an unusually high standard of ethical or moral conduct with
reference to another.""8 Similarly, Professor Scott states that "[a]
fiduciary relationship involves a duty on the part of the fiduciary to
act for the benefit of the other party to the relation as to matters
within the scope of the relation."89 Both definitions are conclusory
and do nothing to identify the circumstances where the relationship
arises. Black's Law Dictionary restates Professor Scott's definition,
and goes on to describe the following four situations where the
fiduciary relationship "usually" arises: (1) when one person places
trust in the faithful integrity of another, who as a result gains
superiority or influence over the first; (2) when one person assumes
control and responsibility over another; (3) when one person has a
duty to act for or give advice to another on matters falling within the
scope of the relationship; or (4) when there is a specific relationship
that has traditionally been recognized as involving fiduciary duties,
as with a lawyer and a client.9" As pointed out by Professor Scott,
a person is labeled a fiduciary only when he or she has in some way
accepted the role.91
Certain types of relationships have traditionally been categorized
as fiduciary in nature, including trustee-beneficiary, principal-
agent, guardian-ward, attorney-client, executor-estate beneficiary,
partner-partner, director-corporation and shareholders, and
majority shareholder-minority shareholder. 2
In addition to the traditional categories, courts have found a
fiduciary relationship in other contexts, depending on the circum-
stances. For example, an insurance company may be a fiduciary to
its insureds,93 an employee may be a fiduciary to her employer,14 a
Is 1 GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1, at
3 (2d rev. ed. 1984).
89 1 AUSTIN W. ScoTr & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 2.5 (4th ed. 1987).
BLACIeS LAW DICTIONARY 640 (7th ed. 1999).
9 1 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 89, § 35 (discussing acceptance in trustee context).
Frankel, supra note 3, at 795-96; Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L.
REV. 539, 541 (1949).
' E.g., Lloyd's & Inst. ofLondon Underwriting Cos. v. Fulton, 2 P.3d 1199, 1208 (Alaska
2000) (noting "special fiduciary relationship that exists between an insurer and its insureds");
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Didion Mid-South Corp., 987 S.W.2d 745, 748 (Ark. Ct. App.
1999) (holding mismanagement of claims by workers' compensation insurer constituted
breach of fiduciary duty to employer).
' E.g., Sara Lee Corp. v. Carter, 519 S.E.2d 308, 310-12 (N.C. 1999) (stating employee
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priest may be a fiduciary to a penitent, 5 and a bank may be a
fiduciary to a customer. 6 In order to determine whether a relation-
ship that does not fit within a traditional category is nonetheless
fiduciary in nature, courts will analogize to the traditional relation-
ships.9
7
There is a core of fiduciary duties that sets forth the conse-
quences of the characterization, although the duties of each type of
fiduciary will vary somewhat.9" Generally, fiduciary responsibilities
are as follows: to refrain from intentionally exploiting the relation-
ship for personal gain (the duty of loyalty), and to carry out the
fiduciary actions competently and without negligence (the duty of
care).99
The basic duty of a fiduciary is the duty of loyalty.1"0 An article
discussing fiduciary duty would not be complete without a reference
to the definitive quote from Justice Cardozo: "A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is
then the standard of behavior."' While that duty is impossible to
define with precision, it prohibits the iduciary from placing his own
interests above the interests of the beneficiary.0 2 It also gives rise
who sells computer parts and services to employer from companies owned by employee owes
fiduciary duty to employer).
' E.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 322-23 (Colo. 1993) (finding record
below supporting existence of fiduciary relationship between bishop and parishioner).
' Succession of McKnight, 768 So. 2d 794, 798 (La. Ct. App. 2000), cert. denied, 785 So.
2d 822 (La. 2001) (explaining ordinarily bank not fiduciary to customer, but where bank
negligently represented to customer what was necessary for payable on death provision, bank
breached duty and was liable to intended beneficiary); see generally Kenneth W. Curtis, The
Fiduciary Controversy: Injection of Fiduciary Principles into the Bank-Depositor and Bank-
Borrower Relationships, 20 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 795, 800-06 (1987).
' DeMott, supra note 86, at 879.
98 See Scott, supra note 92, at 541 (noting scope of duty varies with scope of authority
held by fiduciary); see infra notes 115-33 and accompanying text (discussing specific
variations in duty).
' See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J.
625, 655 (1995) ('The law of fiduciary administration ... resolves into two great principles,
the duties of loyalty and prudence.").
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusrs § 170 (1959); Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken
vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L.
REV. 897, 909 (1994).
101 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (involving duty of one joint
venturer owed to another, rather than traditional fiduciary relationship).
102 Scallen, supra note 100, at 908-10.
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to more specific duties, such as the prohibition against self-dealing
and conflicts of interest.'08
The duty of care imposes on a fiduciary a duty to carry out the
fiduciary purpose," 4 to be prudent in his actions,"0 5 to protect
property entrusted to the fiduciary in the fiduciary capacity, 106 to
earmark such property and not to commingle it with the fiduciary's
own assets, 10 7 to invest such property prudently,0 8 which may
include a duty to diversify,'0 9 to account to the beneficiaries, 110 and
to be impartial in his treatment of the persons who hold an interest
in the fiduciary property."'
Remedies for breach of fiduciary duty go beyond compensating
the beneficiary. A fiduciary who breaches the duty of loyalty must
disgorge any profits the fiduciary received as a result of the
wrongdoing." 2  Unlike contract remedies that aim to put the
aggrieved party in the same position as he would have been in
absent the breach, the disgorgement remedy's goal is to put the
fiduciary-wrongdoer in the same position she would have occupied
had she not breached her duties."' In addition, once the beneficiary
or other protected party has shown facts indicating self-dealing or
any other conflict of interest, the burden shifts to the fiduciary to
show that the transaction was fair."4
'03 Id. at 909-10.
2A ScowT & FRATCHER, supra note 89, § 170.
100 Id. § 174.
106 Id. § 176.
'0 Id. § 179.1 & 179.3.
,08 Id. § 181.
109 Id.
110 Id. § 172.
... Id. § 183.
112 SeeJ.C. SHEPHERD, THELAWOFFIDUCIARIES 116-21,174(1981) (discussing differences
and similarities between contractual and fiduciary relationships); 2A Scorr & FRATCHER,
supra note 89, § 170.25 (noting rigorous standard of conduct trustees are held to when acting
on behalf of beneficiaries).
113 Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1051-53 (1991).
14 See SHEPHERD, supra note 112, at 126-30 (discussing procedural devices used to
discover breach of fiduciary duty). The burden of proof shifts because of the difficulty in
proving a breach of loyalty, thus if the beneficiary had the burden of proving the unfairness,
the dishonest fiduciary would be more likely to avoid detection and consequences of disloyalty.
See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 113, at 1053-56 (discussing how legal rules that presume
misappropriation increase enforcement probability).
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B. TRADITIONAL CATEGORIES OF FIDUCIARIES AND THEIR VARYING
DUTIES
The specific circumstances of a fiduciary relationship, which may
include which traditional category is applicable, refine the fidu-
ciary's general duties." 5 As one commentator has stated:
The greater the independent authority to be exercised
by the fiduciary, the greater the scope of his fiduciary
duty. Thus, a trustee is under a stricter duty of
loyalty than is an agent upon whom limited authority
is conferred or a corporate director who can act only
as a member of the board of directors or a promoter
acting for investors in a new corporation.1
1 6
There are numerous examples of variations of authority and
duties in the traditional categories. The trustee will generally have
the greatest degree of independent authority.' It holds legal title
to fiduciary property and acts independently of direction except from
the trust document," 8 although the trust beneficiaries have the
opportunity to observe the trustee and complain about breaches of
duty."9 A guardian is relatively free of supervision from the ward
because the ward is, by definition, incapacitated, but that supervi-
sory function is undertaken by the court and by state statutes
restricting the guardian's discretion. 20 The guardian's discretion is
therefore held to a narrower range than a trustee's. 2' For example,
guardians must obtain court approval for the sale of guardianship
property,122 whereas trustees have the power to sell by statute,
15 See SHEPHERD, supra note 112, at 109 ("The point here is that it is by analysing the
powers of a fiduciary that we determine the nature of the duty of loyalty he is under.").
116 Scott, supra note 92, at 541.
117 Id.
1s 1 SCoTT &FRATCHER, supra note 89, § 8.
119 Id.
12 Id. § 7.
121 Id.
'2 E.g., UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP &PROTECT1VEPROCEEDINGSACT § 2.109, 8U.LA. 476,476.
77 (1998) (stating powers subject to court approval); WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 11.92.090 (West
1998) (enumerating conditions in which guardianship property may be sold, exchanged,
leased, or mortgaged).
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unless limited by the trust agreement. 12 The trustee's duty to act
prudently in exercising the power of sale would therefore be more
extensive than the guardian acting pursuant to court order.
An agent is presumed to be supervised by the principal, who
retains the ability to revoke the agency at any time. An agent
therefore has a duty to obey the instructions of the principal. 2 4 This
duty contrasts with the duty of a trustee to carry out the terms of
the trust in the best interests of the beneficiaries, rather than
obeying the beneficiaries' instructions. 125  Thus, a trustee must
exercise independent judgment regarding investment of trust assets
(unless otherwise constrained by the trust agreement), but an agent
is under a duty to follow the principal's desires regarding invest-
ment of assets given to the agent to protect. 12  Because of the
principal's supervision of an agent, the agent owes a somewhat less
rigorous duty of loyalty than a trustee. 27 By contrast, an agent's
actions may bind the principal, whereas a trustee's actions can only
bind the trust assets and would not create personal liability for the
beneficiaries. 12
8
Another distinction surrounds the duty to act. A trustee has a
duty to act to protect the trust property, invest it prudently and
123 E.g., UNIF. TRUSTEES' PowERs ACT § 3, 7C U.L.A. 401, 401-03 (2000) (enumerating
specific powers commonly conferred upon trustees); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.070 (West 1998)
(stating trustee powers).
124 1 MECHEM, supra note 14, § 1244, at 911.
125 1 SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 89, § 8.
12s HAROLD G. REuscHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNER-
SHIP § 16, at 44 (2d ed. 1990).
'2 The trustee is always held to a duty of fairness when self-dealing, even when he acts
with the consent of the beneficiary, but the agent can freely deal with the principal's property
with the principal's consent. Compare RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFAGENCY § 390 cmt. c (1958)
with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt. w (1959) (noting even when trustee has
beneficiary's consent and transaction is reasonable, beneficiary can still have transaction set
aside if certain factors are or are not present), and 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 89, §
170 (explaining where trustee acts without beneficiary consent, transaction is always
voidable; however, even with beneficiary consent, transaction may still be voidable if trustee
failed to disclose material facts, used her position of influence inappropriately, or conducted
transaction unfairly).
128 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 144 (1958) ("If the principal is not in a dependent
position... and the agent fully performs his duties of disclosure, or transaction... is not
voidable merely because the principal receives an inadequate price or pays too great a price.");
3A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 89, §§ 277, 277.1.
[Vol. 36:1
DURABLE POWERS OFATTORNEY
make it productive. 2 ' An agent, on the other hand, has a duty to act
only as directed by the principal.3 0
Considering the duties of fiduciaries in the corporate setting
further illustrates this variation. The modern rule regarding
conflicts of interest of corporate directors is that a transaction in
which a corporate director had a conflicting interest cannot be set
aside by a shareholderif the transaction is fair to the corporation.'
That rule is more generous than the requirement of voidability of a
trustee's self-interested transaction regardless of its fairness.3 2 In
business relationships, such as majority shareholder to minority
shareholder, or partner to partner, the closer the fiduciary's own
interests are to those of the beneficiary, the less stringent the duty
of loyalty.133
Therefore, even among the traditional categories, the specific
duties required by fiduciary status vary depending on the nature of
the relationship and the extent of the fiduciary's discretion and
authority.
C. "SITUATIONAL FIDUCIARIES"
A court will often label a party as a fiduciary, even if the facts do
not fit within one of the recognized categories, if the court finds that
certain defining elements of the fiduciary are present. Generally,
12 2A ScoTT & FRATCHER, supra note 89, §§ 175, 176.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 383 (1958).
ls DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144 (1991); see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 702 (1982) ('[Mjanagers of a corporation
are free to funnel business to another corporation in which they have an interest if the
transaction is... 'fair (advantageous) to the firm.").
12 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 89, § 170 (explaining without beneficiary consent,
self-interested transactions by trustee are voidable despite good faith or fairness); see also
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 131, at 702 n.13 (stating reason for difference in duty is
that interests of principals are different). Note, however, if the trustee's act is classified as
merely a conflict of interest, rather than self-dealing, the transaction would not be voidable
if shown to be fair. See In re Rothko, 372 N.E.2d 291, 295-96 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1977) (holding
executors who bought decedent artiss paintings at less than fair market value for their art
galleries must pay appreciated value at time of trial to estate and new fiduciary could not
reject return of paintings in alternative).
" See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L.
& ECON. 425, 432-34 (1993) (listing various fiduciary relationships and varying duties of
each).
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those elements are a close relationship, an entrusting and accep-
tance of power, and a superiority of position.134 Some courts have
defined the required element as "justifiable trust," in other words,
where one party has justifiably put trust in another to watch out for
the first party's interests. 3 5 A common theme in these cases is the
relaxation of one party's self-interested vigilance or independent
judgment in favor of the other party's protection, because the
circumstances justify the belief that the other is acting in the first
party's best interests.'
The fiduciary principle's roots as an equitable doctrine explain
why it may be applied in certain fact situations that fall outside the
traditional roles.137 The court's purpose of attaching such a label is
remedial, intended to shift the burden of proof, characterize the
party's conduct as a breach of duty, and increase the possibility and
amount of liability.18  There should be a prescriptive purpose as
well: persons in relationships that are not clearly labeled as
fiduciary are in particular need of direction since they are not
forewarned of the need to serve the other's interests. When using
the fiduciary principle remedially, however, the court will generally
pick and choose among the fiduciary duties and impose only those
necessary for protection of the vulnerable party in a situational
"u See Taeger v. Catholic Family & Cmty. Servs., 995 P.2d 721,726 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999)
(finding adoption agency owes fiduciary duty toward adoptive parents because of exclusive
control of information about child's background and necessary trust placed in agency by
parents) (quoting Condos v. Felder, 377 P.2d 305 (Ariz. 1962)).
n See Cowee v. Cornell, 75 N.Y. 91, 99-100 (1878) (finding "trust justifiably reposed"
shifts burden to stronger party to prove no deception or undue influence was used); Crim
Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Tex. 1992)
(requiring special trust and confidence beyond "mere subjective trust alone") (quoting Thigpen
v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1976)); Gregory B. Westfall, Comment, "But I Know It
When I See It: A Practical Framework for Analysis and Argument of Informal Fiduciary
Relationships, 23 TEX. TECH L. REV. 835, 844 (1992) (requiring justifiable trust as explained
in Crim Truck).
"8 See Adickes v. Andreoli, 600 S.W.2d 939, 945-46 (rex. App. 1980) (holding amateur real
estate investor liable for withholding material information because he induced close friend
to join in real estate venture, knowing friend relied on his knowledge of real estate market);
see also P.D. Finn, The Fiduciary Principle, in EQUITIES, FIDUCIARIES AND TRUSTS 1, 46 (T.G.
Youdan ed. 1989) (explaining fiduciary relationship will be found in actual circumstances in
which one party is entitled to expect other party to act in the former's best interests).
13 DeMott, supra note 86, at 880 (giving brief history of equitable evolution of fiduciary
doctrine).
13 Finn, supra note 136, at 24.
[Vol. 36:1
DURABLE POWERS OF ATTORNEY
fiduciary relationship, and only to the degree necessary for that,
protection.
Numerous examples illustrate the peculiar facts that may give
rise to the situational fiduciary label. In Adickes v. Andreoli, "9 the
court found a fiduciary relationship between Mr. Adickes and Mr.
Andreoli, two professional artists who were close friends. 4 ' Mr.
Adickes was impressed with Mr. Andreoli's success in real estate
investing, and he became involved in a real estate project with Mr.
Andreoli on Mr. Andreoli's advice.' In holding Mr. Andreoli liable
for withholding material information about his other interests in the
project, the court held that a fiduciary relationship was established
by the close personal relationship between the two and the fact that
Mr. Andreoli knew that Mr. Adickes relied on his knowledge of the
Houston real estate market.
142
In Taeger v. Catholic Family and Community Services,43 the
court found that an adoption agency was in a fiduciary relationship
to adoptive parents with respect to information about the back-
ground of the child and the biological parents, because it had
exclusive access to that information and the adoptive parents
necessarily placed special trust in the agency to disclose pertinent
information. 4 4 As a result of that fiduciary relationship, the burden
shifted to the agency to prove it acted fairly, and the necessary
standard of care was "the duty to use the utmost fairness and
honesty in its dealings with adoptive parents and the children it
places for adoption."1 45 Accordingly, the appellate court remanded
the case for trial on whether the agency could be held liable for
constructive fraud based on breach of fiduciary duty for withholding
information about a child's biological mother. 46 In this situation,
139 600 S.W.2d at 939.
- Id. at 941-42.
141 Id.
" Id. at 945-46 CA confidential relationship may arise not only from the technical
fiduciary relationships, but may also arise informally from moral, social, domestic, or purely
personal relationships.").
'43 995 P.2d 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
144 Id. at 727-28.
'4 Id. at 729.
1" Id. at 730. The court defined constructive fraud as "a breach of a legal or equitable
duty which, without regard to moral guilt or intent of the person charged, the law declares
fraudulent because the breach tends to deceive others, violates public or private confidences,
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the fiduciary duty of disclosure 47 was imposed because of the
vertical position of the parties with respect to necessary informa-
tion.
In Taeger, the fiduciary responsibility extended only to the duty
to disclose because that was the only relevant duty in the circum-
stances. 14  Another way to accommodate the circumstances is to
reduce the stringency of the duty. When the disparity of power
between the parties is less than the truly vertical trustee-benefi-
ciary arrangement, the duties will be more relative, less absolute.
A good example of this reduction in duty is the marital commu-
nity. In a community property state, husband and wife have equal,
independent management powers over community property, to
varying degrees. 149 One spouse therefore has the power to manage
property that is owned equally by that spouse and the nonacting
spouse, and such power must carry with it some corresponding duty.
However, the managing spouse could not be a full fiduciary, akin to
a trustee, because the spouse is an equal owner and should not have
to subvert her own interests to that of the nonacting spouse. For
example, in Somps v. Somps, 50 the husband's use of separate funds
for an investment opportunity that became available to him because
or injures public interests." Id. at 725 (internal citations omitted).
147 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 381 (1958) (stating agent has duty to use
reasonable efforts to provide his principal with relevant information if he has notice principal
would desire to have this information); 2A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 89, § 113
(indicating duty to provide information); see also Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 573 F.2d
976, 980 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding employer's superiority over its employee created confidential
relationship and duty to inform employee of value of his proposed invention).
"4 See also Buxcel v. First Fid. Bank, 601 N.W.2d 593, 596-97 (S.D. 1999) (holding despite
general rule of nondisclosure bank had duty to disclose distressed financial condition of
grocery store to buyers due to "special circumstances" that bank had financial interest in sale
and was financing sale for buyers). Another example of a court finding a fiduciary
relationship limited to one duty is Schneider v. Plymouth State Coll., 744 A.2d 101, 106 (N.H.
1999) (finding school breached fiduciary duty to student to "create an environment in which
the plaintiff could pursue her education free from sexual harassment").
149 E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-214(B) (West 2000) ("The spouses have equal
management, control and disposition rights over their community property and have equal
power to bind the community."); CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(a) (West 1994) ("[Ejither spouse has
the management and control of the community personalproperty... with like absolute power
of disposition, other than testamentary, as the spouse has of the separate estate of the
spouse."); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. arts. 2345-46 (West 1985) ("Each spouse acting alone may
manage, control, or dispose of community property unless otherwise provided by law.").
'50 58 Cal. Rptr. 304 (Ct. App. 1967).
DURABLE POWERS OF ATTORNEY
of a business partially made up of community property was not a
violation of the fiduciary duty he owed to the community,' 5' even
though a full fiduciary would not be able to take a business opportu-
nity connected with and available to the protected party (such as the
trust, the principal or the corporation).'52
Some state statutes have defined the duty between spouses as
the duty to act "in good faith,"' which seems no higher than the
duty of contracting, nonfiduciary parties. 54 Other states and
commentators have analogized to the fiduciary duties owed by
partners. 5 5 The spousal relationship in a community property
jurisdiction could be considered a status category of fiduciary, like
the traditional categories, without the need for additional facts to
support the characterization, as in a situational fiduciary case.'56
Confusion over the duty owed, however, illustrates both the
recognition of lesser duties where the fiduciary has a necessary
competing interest and the extent to which fiduciary status
encompasses a broad spectrum of relationships with wide variations
in the inequality of the parties' relative positions.
" Id. at 310.
152 See Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71, 78 (Min. 1974) (explaining "one entrusted with
the active management of a corporation... may not exploit his position as an 'insider' by
appropriating to himself a business opportunity properly belonging to the corporation");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 388 cmt. c (1958) (explaining agent has duty to account
for profits made through use of confidential information acquired during employment by
principal); 2A SCOTr & FRATCHER, supra note 89, § 170.21 (stating it is improper for trustee
to purchase property for himself when it is his duty to purchase that property for trust); 1
MECHEM, supra note 14, § 1191 (stating rule that agent "may not deal in the business of his
agency for his own benefitf).
"3 E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 766.15(1) (West 1993) (Tach spouse shall act in good faith with
respect to the other spouse in matters involving marital property or other property of the
other spouse"); see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2354 (West 1985) (stating spouse is liable for
fraud or bad faith in management of community property).
15' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (stating one party's non-
disclosure of fact is equivalent to assertion that fact does not exist if nondisclosure amounts
to lack of good faith and fair dealing).
" See Alexandria Streich, Spousal Fiduciaries in the Marital Partnership: Marriage
Means Business But the Sharks Do Not Have a Code of Conduct, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 367, 391
(1998) (suggesting spouses, like business partners, share authority and confidence in each
other, necessitating imposition of fiduciary duty).
" The California statute expressly labels the husband-wife relationship as fiduciary and
further provides that spouses have the same rights and duties as "nonmarital business
partners." CAL. FAM. CODE § 721(b) (West 1994).
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The line drawn by these cases between fiduciary and
nonfiduciary is difficult to discern. Some cases describing breaches
of fiduciary duty appear to be more accurately characterized as
fraud perpetrated by a person who had some close, confidential
relationship with the victim. 1' Courts may be reaching for the
fiduciary characterization in order to access its remedies, without
proper analysis of the limits of the fiduciary label. As pointed out
by Professor P.D. Finn:
[I]f one cannot find a specific doctrine appropriate to
the circumstances, but if one is committed to exacting
a protective responsibility, the lure to fiduciary law
becomes almost irresistible. ... [I]f the remedy given
by an available doctrine does not meet the perceived
needs of justice in a given case, again the lure is
there . . . to resort to fiduciary law's ample and
flexible remedy system. 5 '
Professor Scott's distinction between fiduciary relationships and
confidential relationships is helpful in identifying possible faux
fiduciary cases:
A confidential relationship exists between two
persons when one has gained the confidence of the
other and purports to act or advise with the other's
interest in mind. A confidential relation may exist
although there is no fiduciary relation; it is particu-
larly likely to exist where there is a family relation-
ship or such a relation of confidence as that which
arises between physician and patient or priest and
penitent. If one person is in a confidential, but not a
fiduciary, relation to another, a transaction between
them will not be set aside at the instance of one of
them unless in fact he reposed confidence in the
... The cases involving sexual abuse by priests may be viewed this way. See supra note
4 (citing examples of fiduciary relationship between clergy and church members).
158 Finn, supra note 136, at 24.
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other, and the other, by fraud or undue influence or
otherwise, abused the confidence placed in him. A
fiduciary relation involves certain consequences as to
transactions between the parties that flow automati-
cally as a matter of law from the relation.159
By contrast, there are breach of contract cases where the court
declined to label the conduct as a breach of fiduciary duty but
nevertheless imposed heightened duties for particular conduct. 6 '
Professor Finn has pointed out that the breach of duty cases run
from selfish to selfless-from cases where a party is expected to be
acting in his own interests, and bound only by unconscionability, to
cases where the party is a full fiduciary and expected to be acting
selflessly.' 6' Included in that spectrum is the good faith duty owed
by contracting parties.'62 What is not clear is the point on that
spectrum where the duty shifts to the "fiduciary" label, with the
attendant shift in the burden of proof and increased remedies. The
existing cases show, however, that once the label is applied, the
consequences of the label vary depending on the nature of the
relationship and the discrepancy in power between the parties.
In summation, outside the traditional categories, the term
fiduciary is used imprecisely, and the cases illustrate a certain
confusion over the essence of fiduciary. Consideration of the facts
of these cases, however, illustrate that the category of fiduciary
relationships is a continuous spectrum where the scrutiny becomes
more forgiving as the slant of the relationship flattens from the true
vertical upper hand of the fiduciary.
D. DEBATE OVER THE NATURE OF THE FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLE
The precise nature of the fiduciary principle has never
been pinned down, 6 ' although it has a long history with the
119 1 SCorr & FRATCHER, supra note 89, § 2.5.
16 See Scallen, supra note 100, at 929.70 (surveying "tortious breach of implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing" and "bad faith breach of contract" cases).
"' Finn, supra note 136, at 3-4.
'1 Id. at 10-24.
16 SHEPHERD, supra note 112, at 3-12; Finn, supra note 136, at 24 ("It is striking that a
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courts, 164 and scholars have long debated the issue.165 Courts have
not added much consistency or precision to the definition, perhaps
because of the context in which courts consider the fiduciary
principle. Generally, when a court is faced with a wrong, the
fiduciary principle is a method by which the court can impose a
higher duty on the wrongdoer. Commentators have used a variety
of methods to devise an overarching principle: analysis of the
various cases as a source of a unifying common thread, philosophical
consideration of the necessary underlying policy, with ensuing
testing of the theory against the case law, and increasingly, a
discussion of what the fiduciary principle should be, to provide
guidance to courts that are struggling without a unifying
principle. 66 A unifying theory is elusive, however, in part because
so many different relationships are characterized as fiduciary,
ranging from trustee-beneficiary to partner-partner and attorney-
client, to relationships that have no formal characterization.1 67 One
commentator has called the role "atomistic." 68 The quest for a
unifying theory has as its purpose a method whereby courts can find
a fairly uniform basis upon which to impose the higher burdens of
proof and stiffer penalties that are attached to the fiduciary label.
The theories are primarily attempts at identifying the crucial
characteristic that courts should look for before labeling someone a
fiduciary.
Professor J.C. Shepherd has summarized various theories of the
essence of fiduciary duty, identifying seven basic formulations:
unjust enrichment, commercial utility, reliance, unequal relation-
ship, property, power and discretion, and undertaking.'69 Initially,
principle so long standing and so widely accepted should be the subject of the uncertainty that
now prevails.").
"' See L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 69, 69-71 (describing
eighteenth-and nineteenth-century cases discussing "trust" or "confidence" as precursors to
fiduciary relationships).
16 SHEPHERD, supra note 112, at 3-5.
'6 See J.C. Shepherd, Toward a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 LAW Q.
REV. 51, 52-53 (1981) [hereinafter Shepherd, Toward a Unified Concept] (describing method
for developing unifying principle).
" See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 133, at 432-34 (defining duties imposed in
several listed relationships).
'6 DeMott, supra note 86, at 915.
10 SHEPHERD, supra note 112, at 51.
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he lists the unjust enrichment theory, which defines a fiduciary
relationship as one where a person holds property or another
advantage which "justice requires should belong to another
person."'7 °  This theory has been criticized as circular, 17 1 and
essentially justifies the enhanced remedies without giving guidance
as to the line between what is just and unjust. Professor Shepherd
points out, however, that it brings to the discussion a notion of
morality as the core of fiduciary duty, as well as a notion of
flexibility in application, necessary in light of the broad range of
relationships to be defined under the doctrine.
7 1
The commercial utility theory would find a fiduciary relationship
if protection of a commercial enterprise required a certain class of
persons to be held to a higher standard of good faith.' This
standard brings in a consideration of the economic utility of
fiduciary concept but, again, is too vague (and perhaps too narrow)
to be useful.
The reliance theory finds a fiduciary relationship whenever one
person has placed his or her trust in another person. "74 This is the
most common definition of a fiduciary,'75 and is one of the defini-
tions in Black's Law Dictionary.76 It looks primarily to the intent
of the person seeking protection, and is both under- and over-
inclusive, because in some cases the person's placing of trust is
unwarranted, defeating the finding of a fiduciary relationship, and
in some cases a fiduciary relationship can be found even where there
has been no explicit reliance. It has also been criticized as being
circular 7 7 and as being descriptive only, rather than analytic. 7 8
Under the unequal relationship theory, a fiduciary relationship
exists if the parties have unequal power, either by virtue of their
170 Shepherd, Toward a Unified Concept, supra note 166, at 53.
' Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 133, at 435.
1 Shepherd, Toward a Unified Concept, supra note 166, at 56.
173 Id. at 56-57; seegenerallyErnestJ. Weinrib, ThelFduciary Obligation, 25U. TORONTO
L.J. 1 (1975) (explaining how development of fiduciary obligation doctrine affects decision-
makers in marketplace).
1 Shepherd, Toward a Unified Concept, supra note 166, at 58.
'75 Id. at 59.
176 See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing how fiduciary relationship is
defined).
'" Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 133, at 435.
178 Shepherd, Toward a Unified Concept, supra note 166, at 59.
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legal relationship, such as trustee-beneficiary, or as a result of
circumstantial dominance of one of the parties.'79 Consequently,
unlike most contractual relationships, a fiduciary relationship is
vertical, rather than horizontal."s A difficulty with this theory is
defining the necessary extent of the dominance, since in most
situations one party will be stronger than the other; rarely is the
playing field exactly level. At what degree of tilt will the variation
in strength create fiduciary responsibilities?
Other theories identified by Professor Shepherd include the
property theory, which bases fiduciary duty in property owned
beneficially by one party and controlled by another,18' the power and
discretion theory, which focuses on the existence of one person's
power over another,8 2 and the undertaking theory, which finds a
fiduciary relationship based on a person's voluntary undertaking to
act for another.'83
As noted by Professor Shepherd, some scholars have concluded
that no single approach covers the field and have instead argued
that a comprehensive fiduciary principle would include two or more
of these concepts.I8 4 He objects to this approach, however, on the
grounds that a list approach is not sufficiently flexible and dilutes
the notion that "fiduciary" is an integrated whole.8 5 Professor
Shepherd concludes that a formulation of the fiduciary principle he
calls "the transfer of encumbered power" would be more accurate
and comprehensive than the other approaches.8 6 That formulation
describes a fiduciary relationship as follows: "A fiduciary relation-
ship exists whenever any person acquires a power of any type on
condition that he also receive with it a duty to utilize that power in
the best interests of another, and the recipient of the power uses
179 Id. at 61.
"o See Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory ofFiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 767, 775-76 (2000) (describing vertical characterization of fiduciary relationships and
consequences of that characterization).
'8' Shepherd, Toward a Unified Concept, supra note 166, at 63.
182 Id. at 68.
1"c Id. at 64.
184 SHEPHERD, supra note 112, at 88-89; see also BLACICS LAW DIcTIONARY 640 (7th ed.
1999) (providing "list" definition of fiduciary).
18s SHEPHERD, supra note 112, at 90-91.
18 Id. at 102-08.
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that power.""' Again, these various definitions are all attempts at
identifying the critical characteristic of a fiduciary, so that some
consistency could be achieved in imposing the higher remedies.
One theory that has recently been advanced states that fiduciary
duty is really not a separate principle, but a set of contractual
principles called into play when the contractual duties in question
are difficult to specify and monitor. 8  In other words, fiduciary
duties are merely implied contractual terms-default rules-that
are present in certain contracts, and that may be waived by express
terms of the contract." 9 Fiduciary duty is not a separate species of
duty under this theory but rather is just one end of the spectrum
that begins with contractual good faith.' The remedy for a
fiduciary's breach of loyalty--disgorgement of the fiduciary's
profit-is on its face difficult to reconcile with the contractual theory
because contractual damages generally focus on the wronged party's
loss, thus allowing for economically feasible breach.' 9' Some
contractarians argue that disgorgement is consistent with a contract
theory. Even for fiduciaries, disgorgement is a limited remedy
applicable only to breach of loyalty, and the difficulty in detecting
breaches of loyalty (such as misappropriation) requires high
penalties, exceeding the potential profit, in order to provide
'87 Id. at 96. Interestingly, Professor Shepherd notes that this description could include
contractual duties that currently are not treated as fiduciary, which may argue against his
formulation. In particular, the doctrine of efficient breach is inconsistent with the fiduciary
remedy of disgorgement, indicating that a proper fiduciary concept could not include
contractual relationships that allow efficient breach. He argues that rather than disproving
his theory as overbroad the acceptability of efficient breach is an "anomalous exception" to
his theory. Id. at 119-23.
' Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 133, at 427.
' See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REv. 1209, 1231-42
(1995) (describing characteristics and boundaries of fiduciary rules as default rules and
describing required process for waiver of fiduciary duties); see also Henry Hansmann & Ugo
Mattei, TheFunctions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and EconomicAnalysis, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 434, 448-50 (1998) (determining what separate function trust law serves, apart from
contract and agency law, and concluding fiduciary duties could be included as part of contract
and therefore add no independent value to separate set of trust rules).
" Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 133, at 438; see Finn, supra note 136, at 4
(identifying spectrum of behaviors from selfish to selfless, and standards progressing from
prohibiting unconscionability to those requiring good faith and then full fiduciary duty).
191 Supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
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deterrence.192 The measure of such a remedy is what the parties
would have contracted for in a transaction-cost-free environment.193
Two related discussions focus on the contractarian nature of
separate areas of law that include fiduciary principles. The first of
these discussions is whether trust law is a branch of contract or
property law. This discussion overlaps but is not concurrent with
the fiduciary principle discussion, since trust law includes fiduciary
principles but also encompasses the broad range of formation and
administration issues.' 94 Professor John Langbein has urged a
contractarian view of trust law, in large part because of practical,
normative concerns. His concern is that trust law as applied by the
courts lacks the flexibility of contractual principles and limits the
ability of the parties to a trust to carry out their intentions. 95
Professor Langbein distinguishes trust law from agency law, which
expressly acknowledges its contract basis.9 6 Although his concerns
are broader, he specifically addresses the fiduciary aspect of trusts
and concludes that it, too, is contractarian, as a set of default
principles that can be altered by the parties' agreement.'97 He
bemoans the moralistic rhetoric used by courts because the sermon-
izing cuts off the analysis, which muddles definitions of who is a
" Cooter & Freedman, supra note 113, at 1051-53. While disgorgement only equals the
wrongdoing fiduciary's profit, rather than exceeding it, the shift of burden to the fiduciary to
prove lack of wrongdoing sufficiently increases penalty to make breach unattractive. Id.
'93 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 133, at 441.
"94 Professors Hansmann and Mattei conclude that trust law has a unique advantage over
contract principles in that it creates new rules for liability to third parties, but that with
respect to fiduciary principles, those rules could be part of any contractual arrangement and
seem "a relatively unimportant reason for maintaining a separate law of trusts." Hansmann
& Mattei, supra note 189, at 438.
" Langbein, supra note 99, at 663-67 (The contractarian premise is that the law should
strive to implement the trust deal, the deal between settlor and trustee."). He gives as an
example of the failure of trust law in this regard, the situation where a child who is also a
beneficiary is named as trustee by a parent-settlor. Id. at 663-64. The intention of the
parties would presumably be more tolerant of conflicts of interest than the situation where
a bank was named as trustee, but in the absence of specific language in the trust, the two
types of trustees are treated the same. Id. at 667.
'" Id. at 649. Professor Langbein explains the difference from an historical perspective:
trust law arose from equity, and Professor Scott defined trust law as separate from contract
law in part to maintain equitable jurisdiction. Agency law, on the other hand, developed in
the common law. Id. at 647-49.
'9 Id. at 655-59.
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fiduciary and confuses any detailed descriptions of the particular
duties owed in the situation under consideration.1 9
There is a similar debate about the nature of corporate law and
whether its parameters are bound by contract law or extend beyond
contracts to include overriding principles. This complex debate
encompasses broad issues, such as the characteristics of the various
relationships in the corporate form and whether such relationships
(such as shareholder to management) can be defined as
contractual.'99 As part of this debate, the contractarians argue that
the fiduciary relationships inherent in the corporate structure200 are
a part of the corporate contract and therefore negotiable. 20 1
The scholars that object to the characterization of fiduciary duties
as default contract terms generally distinguish the fiduciary
relationship as vertical, as opposed to the assumed horizontal
nature of contractual relationships. In other words, the fiduciary
relationship is defined by the power held by the fiduciary over the
protected person, as opposed to the equal power in contracting
parties.0 2 In this view, fiduciary duties are more than gap-filling
terms imbedded in a certain type of contract, because under general
contract law, judges must fill contractual gaps conservatively,
rather than expansively.23 Fiduciary duties, on the other hand, are
anything but restrictive. 4
' Id. at 658-59.
"s See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A
Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990) ('Contractarians view the
corporation as a set of private contractual relationships among providers of capital and
services. Anti-contractarians argue that the corporation is either not a contract at all, or at
least is subject to more intrusive government regulation than other contracts.").
See WIIjAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABIIUTY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
DIRECroRs §§ 1-7, 1-13 (6th ed. 1998) (explaining fiduciary relationships of director/
shareholder and majority/minority shareholder).
"0 Butler & Ribstein, supra note 199, at 28-32; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 133,
at 427.
m See DeMott, supra note 86, at 903-05 (contrasting contractual duties of good faith and
fiduciary duty). The difference in the relationship leads to fundamentally different duties.
"The picture that emerges from the case law is that in contractual relationships the duty is
'don't screw the other side,' but with regard to fiduciary relationships the demand to the
fiduciary is 'protect your beneficiary, not yourself.0 " Alexander, supra note 180, at 776.
' See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97 (1989) (criticizing general contract law in favor
of penalty defaults).
204 See Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV.
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In addition, contractual analysis, which views fiduciary duty as
what the parties would have negotiated for if they had addressed
the issue, fails to accommodate the instances where fiduciary duty
is imposed in spite of contract terms and the expressed intentions
of the parties." 5 For example, in Arnott v. American Oil Co.,2 6 the
court imposed fiduciary duties on a franchisor not to terminate the
franchise even though the agreement would have allowed the
franchisor to terminate under the existing circumstances.2 7
Additional objections to the contractarian theory treat it as descrip-
tive and point out that the moral overtones of the judicial discourse
indicate that something more than breach of contract is at stake.08
Also, the variance of fiduciary punitive remedies, such as disgorge-
ment, from contract remedies, which focus on restitution rather
than punishment, can be seen as placing fiduciary breach as a
category separate from contractual breach.20 9
Professor Scott FitzGibbon attacks the potential normative intent
of the contractarians, arguing that fiduciary duty as a principle
separate from contract reflects "the precepts of social morality and
practice"210 and serves social purposes that could not be contem-
plated using the self-interest bias of contract law.21 Professor Joan
Scallen proposed a "new fiduciary principle" as an explanation for
tort damages awarded in contract cases: that there is a difference
between a promise broken and a promise betrayed.212 A betrayed
promise results in psychological and emotional damage as well as
economic damage, justifying and explaining the contract cases that
impose damages beyond contractual principles.2 3
The purpose of the debate extends beyond labels, and is intended
to inform courts when analyzing particular cases as to the extent of
303, 334-35 (1999) (referring to fiduciary doctrines as "aggressive and sweeping).
205 DeMott, supra note 86, at 887.
26 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979).
207 Id. at 877-79, 882-84; cf. Bain v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 692 F.2d 43, 48 (8th Cir.
1982) (criticizing Arnott courts use of term "fiduciary.").
' Scallen, supra note 100, at 921.
2o9 Id.
210 FitzGibbon, supra note 204, at 338.
211 Id. at 346-53.
212 Scallen, supra note 100, at 979.
213 Id. at 978.
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the duty and the appropriate remedies. Characterization of the
principle should give courts a road map, a template in determining
whether a particular relationship is fiduciary.
The characterization of a fiduciary duty as contractual has a
further normative purpose; however, its focus is to remove the
moralistic rhetoric and-redirect the court's attention to intent of the
parties. As described by Professor Gregory Alexander, a fiduciary
analysis is "top-down"-guided by hindsight and what the court
thinks the fiduciary should have done; whereas, contract analysis is
"bottom-up"--drawing conclusions from an analysis of the underly-
ing facts.214 In other words, the fiduciary label creates a bias that
may restrict the court's analysis of the actual circumstances.
In sum, the scholars grapple with two essential questions. First,
what circumstances justify the imposition of superseding duties and
selflessness on one party to a relationship, in spite of the parties'
agreement? Do those duties arise from some moral obligation or
external need, or are they merely an assumption of what the parties
would have wanted had they fully detailed their
relationship-playing a role similar to intestacy laws that approxi-
mate a decedent's intent where the decedent failed to leave a will?
The answer to this question colors both the methodology used to
identify when higher duties are called for, and the formulation of
those duties when they are found to exist.
The second question concerns the identification of a fiduciary.
What are the defining characteristics of a relationship that must be
present in order to justify the imposition of these higher duties? In
order to answer that question, the underlying purpose of fiduciary
rules must be weighed.
IV. THE DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY'S ROLE IN
DEFINING THE FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLE
In the discussions on the nature of the fiduciary principle,
prototype fiduciary relationships such as those found in the trust,
corporate and commercial context have been used to test the various
theories. Durable powers of attorney have maintained a low profile
214 Alexander, supra note 180, at 768.
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in this debate, probably because they have such a short history and
have received so little scholarly and judicial attention. However,
their peculiar undefined nature, coupled with the one certainty that
attorneys-in-fact are fiduciaries, create the potential for insights
that inform the general fiduciary debate.
Initially one must question the purpose of the debate and the
purpose of fiduciary principles in general. The commentators have
not done much more than speculate on the question of whether the
characterization of fiduciary duty is contractual or something
separate. 15 Professor Langbein indicates that a contractual
viewpoint would move judicial analysis away from the "top-down"
moralizing to a "bottom-up" consideration of the evidence before
drawing conclusions and would give more weight to the intention of
the parties. 16 On the other end of the discussion, Professor
Scallen's proposal of a "new" fiduciary principle is intended to
expand the fiduciary category to relationships in those commercial
situations where a promise has been betrayed rather than broken,
thus warranting the imposition of the harsher fiduciary standards
of conduct and damages." The crux seems to be whether there is
a moral overtone to judgment of the wrongdoer.
Consider this question in the context of durable powers of
attorney. The typical arrangement is a family member who has
agreed to handle the finances for an elderly relative, usually for no
compensation. Recall that the original intent of the durable power
of attorney was to address a specific social problem: the need for an
economical method of assisting mentally frail adults with their
financial and personal business matters. The context is therefore
far from commercial. 18 One would have to strain to fit the power of
215 See DeMott, supra note 86, at 888 (describing different remedies available under either
contract basis or under fiduciary duty basis); FitzGibbon, supra note 204, at 337-38
(describing social morality basis for fiduciary relationships outside of contract law).
216 Langbein, supra note 99, at 650-65.
217 Scallen, supra note 100, at 901-02.
218 In some settings, the power of attorney could create a commercial relationship. For
example, one business partner who will be unavailable to execute documents at the closing
of a transaction may give a limited power of attorney to a business associate, authorizing the
attorney-in-fact to sign the documents for the principal. This discussion, however, considers
only the durable power of attorney used for disability planning, i.e., it assumes an attorney-in-
fact acting under a general durable power of attorney for an incompetent principal.
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attorney into a contract mode, since even though strictly speaking
the attorney-in-fact can be said to have entered into an agency
contract, there is little or no benefit in the arrangement for the
attorney-in-fact. Indeed, we would be uncomfortable with an
attorney-in-fact that has taken on the role for personal profit
because of his unfettered, unsupervised control over the principal's
assets and affairs.
So what is the motivation for individuals who have agreed to take
on this role? It is telling that corporate fiduciaries are generally
unwilling to serve as attorneys-in-fact. A younger family member
acting as attorney-in-fact for an older relative is most likely
motivated by a mixture of factors. He may be motivated by familial
duty, genuine concern for the well-being of the older family member,
or by a somewhat self-interested desire to handle the older family
member's affairs in a cost-effective and private manner, thus
preserving the older family member's estate and protecting her
assets from waste or misappropriation by another, perhaps
increasing the younger family member's future inheritance and
avoiding the possibility that the younger family member would have
to take on the financial burden of caring for the older family
member when her own funds were exhausted. In sum, the attorney-
in-fact's family connections with the principal create an interest in
protecting the principal's best interests. Any self-interest beyond
that begins to appear improper and renders the attorney-in-fact
suspect. In fact, there is no role for self-interest in the attorney-in-
fact's actions, and serving self-interest in this context crosses into
criminal activity very quickly. Our image of the ideal attorney-in-
fact who is not part of the close family group would be someone
genuinely altruistic who takes on the role reluctantly and only in
circumstances where the principal genuinely needs their assistance,
and where there is no alternative.
This exercise of visualizing the ideal attorney-in-fact, and
exploring our zone of comfort in the motives of an attorney-in-fact,
results, interestingly enough, in a description of the duty of loyalty.
By contrast, parties to a contract are expected to have self-interests
that will be served by the contract, and the overarching duties of
good faith are meant to prevent overzealous pursuit of those self-
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interests in an unfair manner."9 Such superimposed duties protect
the viability of freedom to contract and to pursue our self-interests,
generally. Even in the context of trustees and corporate directors,
who are clearly fiduciaries, there is an expectation of self-interest.
The trustee may charge fees, and a professional trustee provides
those services as a means of profit. Corporate managers have also
entered into those relationships for the self-interested purpose of
personal profit. So, although commentators have, on the basis of
these traditional fiduciaries, pronounced that fiduciaries are not
expected to be entirely selfless,22 ° the attorney-in-fact for an
incapacitated principal perhaps comes the closest to that expecta-
tion. This fiduciary role therefore illustrates better than any other
that the characterization of fiduciary indicates a qualitative
difference from other relationships, where altruism, or at least a
concern broader than one's own self-interest, should be the guiding
motivation. Fiduciary principles recognize that we cannot legislate
motivation and morality; instead, we demand the external manifes-
tations of the proper motivation by dictating standards and
imposing harsh penalties for violating those standards that focus on
the behavior of the wrongdoer rather than the damages of the
victim.
221
Professor FitzGibbon objects to the contractarian view of
fiduciary duty believing it to be too narrow.2 22 He takes the position
that efficiency is not the only goal of the law, that the fiduciary
principle "reflect[s] the precepts of social morality and practice' 223
and serves to promote virtue. 224 The durable power of attorney
seems to support this conclusion, since the purpose of the duties it
imposes is to superimpose virtue in place of supervision on the role
of the attorney-in-fact, in order to provide care for vulnerable
219 See Alexander, supra note 180, at 775-76 (comparing weaker "good faith obligation" in
contract setting to fiduciary duty higher duty of loyalty).
' See Scallen, supra note 100, at 908-09 (explaining role of self-interest in fiduciary
relationships).
"' See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 113, at 1069 (explaining how punishing wrongdoer
is sometimes necessary to create adequate incentives for compliance with fiduciary duties).
z2 See infra notes 223.24 and accompanying text (discussing how new fiduciary principles
promote social morality and virtue).
FitzGibbon, supra note 204, at 338.
2 Id. at 346-48.
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persons. The recent legislative activity indicates that our state
legislators, who presumably act in accordance with popular opinion,
view the durable power of attorney as more than a contract. The
extreme penalties, involved including forfeiture of inheritance and
jail time, implies a moral judgment far beyond a breach of
contract. 25
But does the moral tone hinder the analysis, as Professor
Langbein indicates? 226 At what point along Professor Finn's
continuum from selfishness to selflessness is there a change in the
quality of the role?2 7 Surely those of us unfamiliar with automobile
repair are at the mercy of the auto mechanic, but at what point does
that unilateral power in the relationship change to a moral duty?
Professor Finn concludes that too often courts resort to fiduciary
language because of the enticing flexibility of the remedies, and that
if a breach of ordinary "good faith" had similar flexibility in remedy
that the moralizing would be unnecessary. 2
Perhaps the answer is that both the contractarians and their
opponents are near the mark. The contractarians are right that
there is no breaking point in the continuum of duty of fair dealing
in relationships, that there is no separate, discrete category of
fiduciary that is qualitatively distinctive from other relationships,
229
and that fiduciary duties are, to a large extent, necessary gap-fillers
for the express terms of the relationships that people create. It is
also true that the moralizing tone, the "you're the oldest, you should
know better" mentality shown by both courts and legislatures in this
context can exaggerate and inflate the remedies without a proper
tailoring of those remedies to the actual situation.
However, the anti-contractarians are also correct in asserting
that the purpose of fiduciary rules extends beyond an approximation
m See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text (describing statutory penalties for abuse
of power of attorney).
2 See Langbein, supra note 99, at 643-46 (probing objections to contractarian analysis
of modern trusts).
Finn, supra note 136, at 4.
Id. at 56.
Professor Shepherd agrees but would extend fiduciary lower on the spectrum rather
than eliminate it. See Shepherd, Toward a Unified Concept, supra note 166, at 76 (arguing
to extend fiduciary duties lower on spectrum of duty of fair dealing in relationships rather
than eliminate it).
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of what the parties would have agreed upon if asked. There is an
overriding purpose at work. The particular relationship (such as
principal/attorney-in-fact) has been deemed to play a useful role, but
left to their own devices the parties would fail to give it sufficient
structure to be workable. The legal system could intervene and
provide the necessary supervision. For example, with powers of
attorney, fiduciary duties would be less necessary if the attorney-in-
fact was subject to strict court supervision. However, that supervi-
sion would dilute the usefulness of the arrangement and would be
inefficient overall. Therefore, the legal system instead superim-
poses a structure, an exoskeleton of duties, to hold up the relation-
ship.
Rather than enforcing a moral duty, perhaps the fiduciary
principle seeks to enforce and sustain what the communitarians
consider a major sector, along with government and market: the
community."' Under this philosophy, community motivates
individuals to act for the greater good, not out of altruism, but
because of the mutual benefits to be derived. Neither the govern-
ment nor market forces can comprehensively foster and fill roles
classified as fiduciary, such as the attorney-in-fact. The law
acknowledges the societal need for this relationship, leaves it in the
realm of community rather than over-regulating and over-supervis-
ing it, but provides the necessary remedy where the community good
is violated. This approach to finding a place for the fiduciary
principle is based on mutualism rather than altruism, and may ease
the moralistic tone.
The durable power of attorney may also add to consideration of
the second open question, the necessary elements of a fiduciary
relationship. Both the extreme vulnerability of the principal and
the tenuous nature of the attorney-in-fact's authority affect how we
view the fiduciary duties in this context. The principal is the most
vulnerable of fiduciary protectees because of the lack of any formal
supervision, and that vulnerability creates the need for imposing
corresponding duties on the attorney-in-fact. That vulnerability is
' The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities, http://www.
gwu.edu/-ccps/RCPlatform.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2001); AMITAI ETZIONI, NEXT: THE
ROAD TO THE GOOD SOCIETY 5-19 (2001).
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insufficient by itself, however, to give rise to duty. The attorney-in-
fact is also vulnerable as a result of the lack of structure.
The following is a typical scenario. A power of attorney is
prepared by the principal's lawyer as part of the principal's estate
plan. The power of attorney names a child of the principal as the
attorney-in-fact, but since the power of attorney is effective only on
disability, the child is not consulted about the arrangement. Years
later, the principal has begun to lose capacity, and the child learns
that she has been appointed attorney-in-fact. However, the child
knows almost nothing about the principal's finances and is unsure
whether the principal is sufficiently incapacitated to trigger the
child's authority as attorney-in-fact. Because there is no formal
appointment process, no earmarked property, and no delineated
scope of responsibilities, fiduciary duties should be imposed only to
the extent the attorney-in-fact knows of the role, is able to accept
responsibility, and affirmatively accepts. Thus, a fiduciary relation-
ship should be defined by both parties' positions.
The role of fiduciary duties in this context is to substitute for
supervision. Supervision would defeat the purpose of the arrange-
ment, but a complete lack of protection of the principal would also
make the arrangement unworkable and undesirable.
Professor Frankel describes a fiduciary relationship as "a
consensual arrangement covering special situations in which
fiduciaries promise to perform services for entrustors and receive
substantial power to effectuate the performance of the services,
while entrustors cannot efficiently monitor the fiduciaries' perfor-
mance.""3' This definition includes the elements of acceptance by
the fiduciary, vulnerability of the entrustor and the need for
fiduciary rules to substitute for monitoring-the elements of the
durable power of attorney relationship that justify the higher duties.
Continued exploration of a defining fiduciary principle leads to
analysis of its purpose, and in turn, the question of whether a
particular relationship should be called fiduciary. Any definition
should encompass a purpose-incentive to act selflessly for a
community benefit in place of external monitoring. That purpose
perhaps may tone down the moralistic undertone of fiduciary
11 Frankel, supra note 189, at 1212.
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analysis and refocus on whether a lack of monitoring needs remedy.
The durable power of attorney illustrates both the purpose of
fiduciary duties and the need for a consideration of both parties'
viewpoints in any characterization.
V. THE APPLICATION OF FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLE TO
THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT SERVING UNDER
A DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY
A. IDENTIFICATION OF OPEN ISSUES FOR THE ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
We now shift focus to the predicament of the attorney-in-fact,
attempting to carry out her duties faithfully and without liability in
the confusing climate of amorphous fiduciary principles and the
even less-defined role of an attorney-in-fact. The role of an attorney-
in-fact serving under a durable power of attorney has been described
as "unscripted."'232 The unscripted nature of the attorney-in-fact's
task is primarily a result of the durable power of attorney's
evolution and its relatively brief history. The intent in creating the
durable power of attorney was to address a specific problem-the
need for an economical, efficient way to handle the financial affairs
of elderly persons."'
The resulting instrument is indeed economical and efficient, but
it is somewhat of a hybrid. The fiduciary duties of an agent were
created under the traditional agency assumption that the agent was
subject to the control of the principal. A durable power of attorney's
major feature is that, unlike traditional powers of attorney that
terminate automatically upon the principal's disability, the durable
power continues in force during the principal's incapacity. The
durability feature shifts the control from principal to agent upon the
principal's incapacity, although the effect of that shift on the
fiduciary role as agent is not clear. Does the agent's role change?
Is the attorney-in-fact for an incapacitated principal more like an
Dessin, supra note 67, at 574.
233 See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text (describing history of durable power of
attorney).
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attorney-in-fact for a competent principal or a trustee?" 4 Or is the
attorney-in-fact more like a guardian? The characterization of the
role, necessary to define the precise duties of an attorney-in-fact and
identify lapses in that duty, was left unaddressed, in part perhaps
because safeguards and controls on the attorney-in-fact would
interfere with the efficiency of its use.2"5 While there have been
some limited attempts to fill the gaps, primarily the durable power
of attorney creates a new breed of fiduciary whose precise duties
have yet to be identified.3 6
A more specific script for the attorney-in-fact is clearly needed
now, however. Powers of attorney are becoming increasingly
common, placing ever-growing numbers of attorneys-in-fact in an
uncertain, perhaps even dangerous, position. Abuse of the instru-
ment is becoming a concern, as part of the overall concern over elder
abuse.3 7 In response to those concerns, durable power of attorney
reform has focused on provisions aimed at curbing such abuse. 8
These provisions primarily involve added oversight of the attorney-
in-fact's actions.23 9 In addition, however, and alarmingly for the
honest attorney-in-fact, there is a trend toward enhanced criminal
penalties and civil remedies for abuse of the power of attorney.24
4 CHARLES CAPLN, POWERSOFATrORNEY8 (Oyez Practice Notes No. 7, 4th ed. rev. 1976)
('Although the law relating to powers of attorney is usually (and no doubt correctly) dealt
with by textwriters as a branch of the general law of agency, it displays many special
features, and may be said to stray, in particular respects, towards trust law."). This was
written at time when only common law powers of attorney were available; predating the
durable power of attorney.
m See FEDERMAN&REED, supra note 63, at 19 ("making them easier to use often involves
making them easier to abuse. At the current time, the conflict has been addressed in a
manner that favors maximizing use while disfavoring prevention of potential abuse.").
' Huff, supra note 24, at 308 (identifying duties of attorney-in-fact as follows: "The
agent must be aware of his duties to act only within his authority, to act solely for the
principal's benefit, not to act after his authority is terminated, not to commingle his
principal's property with his own or that of another, to keep records and accounts, and while
his authority continues to act prudently.").
' See Dessin, Financial Abuse, supra note 72, at 207-10 (describing financial abuse of
elderly in context of fiduciary relationships).
ms FEDERMAN AND REED, supra note 63, at 44-45.
23 See infraonotes 250-56 and accompanying text (describing oversight provisions in
individual state statues).
20 See infra notes 275-84 (describing California, Illinois and Arizona criminal penalty and
civil remedy provisions).
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The risks of falling short on one's duty are increasing but the
definition of that duty remains vague.
The lack of monitoring of an attorney-in-fact also heightens the
need for a more precise definition of the role. While the general
nature of fiduciary responsibilities assumes that the fiduciary's role
is open-ended and unspecified, thus requiring fiduciary duties to put
limits on that discretion,24' the attorney-in-fact with an incapaci-
tated principal is uniquely directionless. Most fiduciary relation-
ships have some monitoring mechanism. For example, the trustee
is required to account to the beneficiaries who in turn can object to
the trustee's performance of his duties by bringing a suit in
equity.242 The guardian is subject to court supervision 4 and the
executor of an estate is answerable both to the court supervising the
probate and the beneficiaries of the estate.244 An attorney-in-fact is
presumed to be supervised by her principal,245 which under common
law is sufficient since the agency would terminate on the principal's
incompetence.246 However, the durable power of attorney statutes,
by extending the agency into the principal's incapacity, removed the
supervision and for the most part did not provide any substitute.
While the Model Act addressed that deficiency by limiting the dollar
amount subject to a durable power of attorney2 47 and by allowing the
241 See SHEPHERD, supra note 112, at 13-15 (describing how fiduciary duties arose in trust
context as antidote to trustees' legal independence and how fiduciary status crept into agency
because agents, although theoretically controlled by principal, could nevertheless act
independently and disloyally).
242 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 199 (1959); see Mark Lacter, The Case of the
Ungrateful Heirs, FORBES Dec. 25, 2000, at 137 (describing lawsuit brought by beneficiaries
of Hearst trust against trustees challenging trustees' plans to merge Hearst Corporation with
another media company).
23 E.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 464-A-26, :27 (1992 & Supp. 2000) (requiring guardians
to file annual accountings to probate courts); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35A-1202, -1301 to -1369
(1999) (requiring approval by courts for some actions of guardians in regards to wards'
estates); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30 §§ 1-101, 1-114 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001) (providing for
exclusive court jurisdictions in appointing, removing and controlling financial actions of
guardians); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-5-301 to -417 (1993 & Supp. 2000) (providing for court
appointment of guardians).
244 Such supervision may be minimal in some jurisdictions. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
ch. 11.68 (West 1998) (providing that personal representatives of estates can petition courts
for nonintervention powers).
245 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 383, 385 (1958).
248 Id. § 122.
247 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 36:1
DURABLE POWERS OFATTORNEY
court to order the attorney-in-fact to account to the principal's "legal
representative,""24 the Uniform Probate Code abandoned those
provisions, presumably to facilitate use of the power of attorney and
thus promote its use.
249
A few state statutes have addressed this lack of supervision. For
example, the North Carolina statute requires that once the principal
is incapacitated, the attorney-in-fact must record the power of
attorney document,250 file inventories of the principal's property in
the "hands" of the attorney-in-fact with the court, and file annual
accountings with the court. 25' However, the power of attorney
document can relieve the attorney-in-fact of this duty. Colorado,252
Missouri,2 53 California,254 and New Hampshire255 allow a person
interested in an incapacitated principal's well-being to petition the
court for an accounting or other relief from an attorney-in-fact.
Tennessee allows an incompetent principal's "next-of-kin" to petition
the court to require the attorney-in-fact to post a bond.256
The North Carolina approach is to treat the durable power of
attorney as a somewhat informal guardianship, whereas the other
states' approaches allow persons close to the principal to take over
the supervisory role once the principal becomes incapacitated. In
statutes that follow the lead of the uniform act and contain no
supervisory provisions, the only avenue in most situations for any
interference with an attorney-in-fact is for an interested party to file
a petition for guardianship or conservatorship once the principal is
incapacitated. Also, many states have statutes that allow civil
remedies for abuse of vulnerable adults.25 A civil action is available
against various defendants.25 The court can consider the actions of
248 1964 HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 280.
249 FEDERMAN & REED, supra note 63, at 14.
m N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-9 (1999).
25' Id. § 32A-11.
252 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-609 (West 1997).
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 404.727 (West 2001).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 4541 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001).
2 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506:7 (1997).
2N TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-6-106 (1996).
27 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 74.34.200 (West 1986 & Supp. 2001) (noting
remedies are available for abandonment, abuse, or financial exploitation).
M id.
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the attorney-in-fact in the course of appointment proceedings,259 or
the guardian or conservator, once appointed, could demand
accountings or remove the attorney-in-fact as the legal representa-
tive of the principal.26
Even in states with supervisory mechanisms, the attorney-in-fact
can operate autonomously when there are no close friends or
relatives available to monitor and question the attorney-in-fact's
performance.26' The North Carolina accounting requirement does
not guarantee that breaches will be detected because that would
depend on the thoroughness of the court monitoring process.62
Other than the accounting, the attorney-in-fact is still free to act
without any interference, unlike a guardian who needs court
approval for most transactions. 63
The lack of a monitoring mechanism can be considered a
disadvantage but is also a primary advantage of a durable power of
attorney, as it facilitates incredible efficiency and economy. To
include a thorough monitoring process would essentially gut the
usefulness of the power of attorney because the increased costs and
intrusiveness would turn it into a de facto guardianship, which was
deemed inadequate years ago.264 The lack of supervision and the
peculiar position of the attorney-in-fact under a durable power of
attorney heightens the need for a specific set of fiduciary duties. 265
Such certainty would serve the dual purposes of giving additional
guidance to the attorney-in-fact and increasing the potential for
finding breach of duties, thereby serving both a deterrence and
remedy function.
Some state statutes attempt to define the scope of the attorney-
in-fact's fiduciary duty, further confusing whether an attorney-in-
29 E.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 11.88.030(1)(i) (West 1998).
M UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-503, 8 U.L.A. 421, 421 (1998).
261 See Burnele V. Powell & Ronald C. Link, The Sense of a Client: Confidentiality Issues
in Representing the Elderly, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1197, 1230 (1994) (attributing autonomy to
coures failure to supervise).
' One respondent to the Albany survey stated that "mandating accounting solves nothing
if the courts are too overwhelmed to do anything." FEDERMAN & REED, supra note 63, at 86.
Dessin, supra note 67, at 590.
See generally Engel, supra note 24; Fred Bayles & Scott McCartney, Declared 'Legally
Dead' Guardian System is Failing the Ailing Elderly, THE RECORD (Northern, N.J.), Sept. 20,
1987, at AO1, available at 1998 WL 4867722.
' Dessin, supra note 67, at 617.
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fact for an incapacitated principal can rely on the fiduciary duties
identified for agents. Other statutory definitions only identify the
fiduciary nature of the role. For example, South Carolina's statute
provides that "the attorney in fact has a fiduciary relationship with
the principal and is accountable and responsible as a fiduciary."2 6
The Indiana statute requires an attorney-in-fact to use "due care, "287
and the Missouri statute requires an attorney-in-fact to act "in the
best interests of the principal," to avoid self-dealing and conflicts of
interest as would a trustee, 268 and to exercise the degree of care a
prudent person would use in dealing with someone else's property. 269
Illinois's statute provides that an attorney-in-fact "shall use due
care to act for the benefit of the principal in accordance with the
terms of the agency and shall be liable for negligent exercise"270 and
further provides that the attorney-in-fact will not be liable for "error
in judgment" or for conflicts of interest or self-dealing, if the
attorney-in-fact otherwise has acted "with due care for the benefit
of the principal."27' This standard is clearly less than the standard
of care that a trustee would be required to observe 72 and may even
be less than the traditional duties of an agent.273
Florida's statute, on the other hand, states that the attorney-in-
fact under a durable power of attorney has the same fiduciary duties
as trustee. 4 This high level of responsibility may be somewhat
problematic; it would presumably include the duty to diversify, the
duty to account, the duty to invest prudently-all duties that may
2 S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-501(a) (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 2000).
27 IND. CODE ANN. § 30-5-6-2 (Michie 2000). The Indiana statute also states that the
attorney-in-fact shall exercise its powers "in a~fiduciary capacity." Id. § 30-5-6-3.
' A trustee is in fact prohibited from engaging in self-dealing or acts involving conflicts
of interest, unless the beneficiaries consent. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) cmt.
a (1959); DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 25, at 904-05.
2 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 404.714 (West 2001).
270 755 IL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 45/2-7 (West 1992).
271 Id.
272 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959) (stating trustee must administer
trust in beneficiary's interest only, treat beneficiary fairly, and communicate relevant
material facts openly).
' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390 cmt. c (1958) (advising agent who is
adverse to principal and who cannot or does not want to give impartial advice has duty to
ensure such advice is given by unbiased third party).
274 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 709.08 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000).
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be difficult to carry out during periods when the principal is still
competent.
The variations among the states in defining the attorney-in-fact's
duty and the inherent confusion as to the precise nature of this
fiduciary are exacerbated by the fact that, in some states, abuse of
a power of attorney where a vulnerable adult is the principal
triggers criminal penalties and enhanced civil penalties. For
example, an Illinois statute provides that financial exploitation of an
elderly or disabled person is a felony;275 the elements of financial
exploitation are found where the exploiter is in a position of
confidence with the vulnerable person, and "knowingly and by
deception or intimidation obtains control over the property" of the
vulnerable person "with the intent to permanently deprive the...
person... of the use, benefit, or possession of his or her property."276
This statute was cited by Judge Posner as authority for the
statement that, "indeed, the breach of a fiduciary obligation to an
elderly person is explicitly a crime in Illinois."2 7' A California
statute provides that a person loses the right to inherit from a
vulnerable adult if that person acted in bad faith and it can be
proven by clear and convincing evidence that the person recklessly
committed "fiduciary abuse" of the vulnerable adult.2 78
In Arizona, an attorney-in-fact "shall use the principal's money,
property or other assets only in the principal's best interest and the
agent shall not use the principal's money, property or other assets
for the agent's benefit."2 79  That provision also states that an
attorney-in-fact violating its requirements is subject to criminal
prosecution. 28 0 In addition, the attorney-in-fact who does not act for
the benefit of the principal "to the same extent as a trustee" is liable
for treble damages and attorneys fees, and forfeits the right to
inherit from the principal, or claim a forced share, omitted spouse
or child's share, homestead or other family support allowance.281
275 720 ILL. CoMP. STAT. § 5/16-1.3 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001).
276 Id.
' Boyce v. Fernandes, 77 F.3d 946, 950 (7th Cir. 1996).
278 CAL. PROB. CODE § 259(a)(1) (West 1991 & Supp. 2001). The statute also provides other
grounds for disinheritance, such as physical abuse and neglect of the decedent. Id.279 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-5506(A) (1995).
28 Id.
28' § 46-456(A), (D).
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The criminal penalties appear to be imposed only when the person
knowingly took control of the principal's assets through intimidation
or deception with intent to deprive the principal of his or her
property.8 2 However, the statute applicable specifically to powers
of attorney23 is broader, providing for potential criminal penalties
any time an attorney-in-fact does not use the principal's property "in
the principal's best interest."2
84
The Arizona bar has expressed concern over the vagueness of
these provisions.285 In particular, there is concern over what it
means to act in the best interest of the principal; the statute defines
"best interest" as where "the agent acts solely for the principal's
benefit."288 That definition is still imprecise and does not indicate
whether negligence would be sufficient to trigger the enhanced
penalties. Also, there is concern as to whether any benefit flowing
to the attorney-in-fact, including nominal benefits such as reim-
bursement of expenses or compensation, would violate the statutory
command to act solely in the principal's best interest.287 Attorneys-
in-fact who are spouses or children have an additional difficulty
because they would often be included among those benefiting from
actions of the attorney-in-fact, such as gifting or other estate
planning. Because of these concerns, and concerns that in dishar-
monious family situations, one family member could create serious
problems for the family member acting as attorney-in-fact,288 many
2 §§ 13-1802(B), 46-456(B).
m § 14-5506.
2 Id. § 14-5506(A).
See Thomas J. Murphy, Drafting Powers of Attorney to Comply with the New
Legislative Changes, ARIZ. ATITY, Dec. 1998, at 22, 22 (stating legislature does not define
"benefit," causing different interpretations of that term).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-5506(F)(1) (1995).
287 Murphy, supra note 285, at 24. There is a statutory exception to the prohibition
against benefit flowing to the attorney-in-fact; if the power of attorney authorizes the benefit,
the benefit is specifically identified in detail and the authorization is initialed by the principal
and a witness. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-5506(B) (1995).
Murphy, supra note 285, at 23.
A grave concern is that the new legislation can create an ominous weapon
in the hands of the children of a first marriage to use against the second
spouse who is the agent of the children's parent. Likewise, a sibling who
feels cheated or who carries a grudge can wreak havoc if the agent fails to
follow the dictates of the new legislation.
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Arizona attorneys were hesitant to continue recommending powers
of attorney to their clients. Instead, Arizona practitioners began
recommending revocable living trusts began," 9 which were long ago
deemed too costly and cumbersome to be generally useful by the
original proponents of the durable power of attorney.290
The trends illustrated by the Illinois, Florida and Arizona
statutes are fueled by increasing concern over elder abuse.291
Nevertheless, as a result of such statutes a well-meaning attorney-
in-fact risks disinheritance or worse when guessing as to what his
duties are.
The attorney-in-fact for an incapacitated principal has unclear
direction as to whether she must act consistent with the principal's
wishes, which is the guide for agents, 292 or whether she must act in
the principal's best interests. These two standards can be inconsis-
tent. Where the principal is competent, the attorney-in-fact can,
except in extreme circumstances, follow the principal's direction,
since the principal's desires are the defining fiduciary purpose in
agencies.29 By contrast, a trustee and a guardian do not take
direction from the beneficiary or ward but are required to act in
their best interests. 294 Once the principal becomes incapacitated
and is no longer able to direct the agent, the fiduciary purpose may
be substantially affected. For example, the principal may have
preferred extremely speculative, risky investments. The attorney-
in-fact, managing those investments on the principal's behalf while
the principal was competent, would have to maintain those
investments as directed by the principal. Once the principal became
2'9 Id.
29o See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing limited utility of estate planning
tools other than power of attorney).
"9 See generally Nina Santo, Comment, Breaking the Silence: Strategies for Combating
ElderAbuse in California, 31 McGEORGEL. REv. 801 (2000) (detailingelder abuse studies and
state and federal legislative and programmatic responses to problem).
m RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY§ 33 cmt. b (1958) ("An agent is a fiduciary under
a duty to obey the will of the principal as he knows it or should know it."); see generally id.§§ 14, 385, 425 cmt. a; cf. Erlich v. First Natl Bank, 505 A.2d 220, 235-36 (N.J. 1984) (noting
investment advisor must prioritize preservation of estate over wishes of principal).
m"' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 33 cmt. b (1958).
2 Id. § 14B cmt. f; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 8 cmt. b (1959); see McGovern,
supra note 11, at 23 (To subject the trustee to the beneficiary's control would defeat the very
purpose of the trust.").
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incapacitated, would the attorney-in-fact have a fiduciary duty to
reinvest in safer investments, or could the attorney-in-fact retain
the risky investments on the assumption that such retention would
be consistent with the principal's wishes? Some commentators have
speculated that the principal's control ceases upon incapacity
295
while others have presumed that the agent has a duty to "act in
accordance with what [the attorney-in-fact] understood the princi-
pal's wishes would be if it were possible to ascertain those
wishes. 296
Some state statutes address this issue, albeit obliquely. For
example, California and Missouri require the attorney-in-fact to stay
in contact with the principal, if possible, and if not possible to
communicate with the principal,27 to communicate as much as
possible with those close to the principal who may know his or her
intentions.2 Those provisions indicate that the attorney-in-fact
must be governed by the principal's wishes.29 The Illinois statute
requires an attorney-in-fact to take the principal's estate plan into
account."' 0 This also implies that the principal's desires are
paramount. By contrast, the Florida statute provides that an
attorney-in-fact has the same fiduciary duties as a trustee,"0 ' which
may imply that the attorney-in-fact must act in the principal's best
interests as opposed to the principal's desires.
Another ambiguous area is the attorney-in-fact's duty to act.
Unlike other traditional fiduciaries, such as trustee, guardian and
29 McGovern, supra note 16, at 28-29.
298 ELIAS S. COHEN, DURABLE POWER OF ATrORNEY: AN IMPORTANT ALTERNATIVE TO
GuARDIANsIP, CONSERVATORSHIP, ORTRUSTEESHIP 4 (Technical Assistance Monograph, U.S.
Dept of Health and Human Services, reprinted with permission from the Mid-Atlantic Long
Term Care Gerontology Center, Temple Univ. Inst. on Aging 1984) ("in the case of an
incapacitated individual, the attorney-in-fact would be bound to act in accordance with what
he understood the principal's wishes would be if it were possible to ascertain those wishes!);
see also Charles M. Hamann, Durable Powers of Attorney, TR. & EST., Feb. 1983, at 28, 29
C'franslating this to a situation in which the principal is incapacitated, we might say that an
agent must act in accordance with what he deems would be the principal's wishes if those
wishes could be ascertained.").
2m CAL. PROB. CODE § 4234 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 404.714.2 (West2001).201 MO. ANN. STAT. § 404.714.2 (West 2001).
2" CAL. PROB. CODE § 4243 cmt. (West 1991 & Supp. 2001).
'o 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 45/2-9 (West 1992).
"o FLA. STAT. ANN. § 709.08(8) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000).
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executors, the attorney-in-fact's authority to act does not carry with
it a corresponding duty to act.302 Professor Carolyn Dessin agrees
that courts and legislatures "must create a role for agents under
durable powers of attorney that makes clear the agent's responsibili-
ties."'3 Her concern focuses primarily on the lack of an attorney-in-
fact's duty to act, and she proposes that statutes impose liability on
attorneys-in-fact for failure to act to protect the principal's property,
once the principal has become incapacitated, and provided that the
attorney-in-fact has accepted the role.0 4 The issue is certainly
troublesome for the principal, especially in light of Professor
Dessin's accurate observation that clients using a durable power of
attorney for disability planning most likely do not fully understand
that the attorney-in-fact has the power, but not the legal obligation,
to handle the principal's affairs when the principal becomes
incapacitated. 305 Her approach would also be consistent with the
definition of fiduciary discussed in Part III.B above, because the
duty is triggered only if the principal needs the protection and if the
attorney-in-fact has consented.
However, the issue can be as troublesome for the careful
attorney-in-fact. It is often not clear at what point the principal has
become incapacitated. Incapacity usually creeps in as a gradual
process, and taking over responsibility for the principal's affairs can
be a delicate matter. If the principal is having difficulty accepting
his or her increasing need for assistance, then the attorney-in-fact
will need to move slowly. The attorney-in-fact may make a determi-
nation that the principal is incapacitated and that the duty to act
has been triggered, but the principal may not accept that conclusion.
If the attorney-in-fact nevertheless takes over the affairs of the
principal, the principal may resist, even to the point of revoking the
power of attorney. It should be noted that execution of the power of
attorney does not affect the authority of the principal to conduct his
or her own affairs; the document supplements rather than supplants
that authority. Since the principal is therefore free to continue to
' RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFAGENCY §§ 377-78 (1958); Dessin, supra note 67, at 604-05.
3 Dessin, supra note 67, at 587.
4 Id. at 607.
Id. at 608.
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manage his or her affairs, even past incapacity, the power of
attorney only works as disability planning when the principal
voluntarily invokes it.
The attorney-in-fact also may have difficulty ascertaining
whether the principal needs assistance. Attorneys-in-fact are
usually family members who have agreed to perform the role out of
a sense of family obligation. Requiring such a pro-active duty as
monitoring the principal's efficiency would make the role extremely
undesirable, particularly where the attorney-in-fact is a child of the
principal who is reluctant to challenge the principal's autonomy and
capabilities. If no family member or friend is available to serve,
professionals such as attorneys and accountants may agree to serve,
and again, the role would be particularly unpalatable if the
professional had the responsibility of monitoring the principal to
know when to step in.
Several states have attempted to address this problem by taking
an approach contrary to Professor Dessin's suggestion, expressly
providing that the attorney-in-fact has no duty to act.'"6 California
provides that there is no duty to act, with the exception that a duty
to act arises if the attorney-in-fact has expressly accepted that duty
in writing.
°3 0
Professor Dessin is correct that once a principal is clearly
incapacitated, there should be a duty on the part of the attorney-in-
fact to step in and handle the principal's affairs, assuming the
attorney-in-fact has agreed to serve. The difficulty, however, is
determining when that duty is triggered. As a practical matter, the
duty to act can be imposed reasonably on an attorney-in-fact only
where the attorney-in-fact has taken over all or parts of the
management of the principal's affairs, so that the duty would be
defined as a prohibition against later abandoning the assumed
301 E.g., 755 ILL. COMP.STAT.ANN. § 45/2-7 (West 1992); IND. CODEANN.§ 30-5-6-1 (Michie
2000) (CThe attorney-in-fact is not required to exercise the powers granted under the power
of attorney or to assume control of or responsibility for any of the principal's property, care
or affairs, regardless of the principal's physical or mental condition.").
3 CAL. PROB. CODE § 4230 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001).
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responsibilities.0 8 Anything more would risk confrontation and
mistrust in the relationship between principal and agent.
Another misalignment between general agency rules and the
durable power of attorney is the ability of the agent to resign. An
agent is required to give notice of resignation to the principal." 9 If
the principal is incapacitated, the attorney-in-fact will have no
effective means of giving notice. This is particularly problematic
because even if the agreement to act is gratuitous, the agent must
continue to carry out her promise to act unless there are other
means to cary out the purpose of the agency and the agent gives
proper notice.310 If the agent abandons the agency, she may be
subject to liability.31' By contrast, a trustee, guardian or probate
executor can obtain permission from the court or the beneficiaries
to resign,312 and can obtain release from liability upon approval of
the resignation. 13 Some state statutes contain provisions allowing
an attorney-in-fact to petition the court for authority to resign.1 4
Despite the lack of a clear fiduciary standard for attorneys-in-
fact, refining the fiduciary duties of the attorney-in-fact receives
This duty exists under the general rules of agency. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 118 cmt. c (1958) (providing for liability ofprincipalor agent, in absence ofprivilege
or supervening circumstances, for revocation or renunciation of authority in breach of
contract).
305 1 MECHEM, supra note 14, § 649, at 461.
310 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 378 (1958); see A.L Moses & Adele J. Pope,
Estate Planning, Disability, and the Durable Power of Attorney, 30 S.C. L. REv. 511, 524
(1979) ("Because of the attorney-in-faces fiduciary relationship to the principal, however, it
is questionable whether the attorney-in-fact can resign after the onset of incompetency if the
resignation would be a detriment to the incompetent principal.").
31 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 14B cmt. h (1958) (allowing termination of
agency at will of principal or agent, subject to contractual liability for wrongful termination).
32 E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 17200 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001) (indicating permission from
court or beneficiaries can be obtained by trustee to resign); IOWA CODEANN. § 633.4106 (West
1992 & Supp. 2001) (describing methods by which trustee may resign); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 555.25 (West 1988) (indicating court of chancery may accept resignation upon petition
of any trustee of express trust).
313 E.g., 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5114 (West 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.6202 (West
1992 & Supp. 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 203, § 14A (West 1990); Wisc. STAT. ANN. §
701.18(1) (West 2001).
314 E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 4541(e) (West 1991 & Supp. 2001) (detailing procedure for
court approval of resignation).
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little attention in the current direction of reform. 15 The current
reform proposals focus on abuse and include:
- enhanced penalties on those who abuse the author-
ity granted under a power of attorney;
- creation of a central registry of attorneys-in-fact,
or a central registry of those convicted of elder
abuse;
- requiring recordation of the power of attorney;
- notification of a third party for significant transac-
tions;
- waiting period between execution and use of the
power of attorney;
- appointment of a third person to monitor the
activities of the attorney-in-fact;
- requirement of annual accountings, to be filed with
the court or with a third party; and
- requiring that the agent be bonded. 16
Most of these proposals are focused on providing oversight, which
is probably the element most likely to prevent abuse. However,
such oversight is not a silver bullet; abuse occurs even in guardian-
ships where court supervision is extremely invasive." 7 The abuse
problem cannot be solved with these statutory modifications,
however. Generally, the abuse that the reformers are concerned
about involves misappropriation of assets, where the thief assumes
that he or she will not get caught. The focus of statutory changes
should instead be on assisting the honest attorney-in-fact in
knowing how to do a good job, on creating oversight that is not
unduly burdensome, and on clarifying the role of the attorney-in-fact
315 But see Schilling, supra note 2, at 250 (reporting 36 of 776 respondents to ACTEC
survey urged instructing agents as to duties and responsibilities, including descriptions of
possible abuse and penalties for abuse).
316 FEDERMAN & REED, supra note 63, at 44-45; see Schilling, supra note 2, at 250 (survey
of estate planning attorneys indicated abuse infrequent and outweighed by advantages of
instrument).
31 See English & Wolff, supra note 70, at 34 ("The survey responses indicate that
guardian abuse is as serious, if not more serious, than [durable power of attorney] abuse.").
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so that the honest attorney-in-fact need not feel threatened by the
enhanced penalties aimed at curtailing outright dishonesty.
B. SUGGESTED STATUTORY IMPROVEMENTS
It is certainly necessary that the details of an attorney-in-fact's
role be clarified. The use of powers of attorney will only increase as
the population ages, and a clear job description is needed to keep the
device useful. Such a job description is necessary both for the
principal's protection, because an informed attorney-in-fact will not
breach duties out of ignorance, and for the attorney-in-fact's
protection, because the current state of the law leaves the attorney-
in-fact guessing as to what his duty actually is. Also, if states
choose to impose heightened penalties for fiduciary abuse, what
constitutes abuse has to be clarified in order to protect the well-
meaning fiduciary. The place to do this is in the statutory scheme.
Although the commentators speculated that courts would define the
role,"'8 that has not happened and is not likely to happen at an
acceptable speed because litigation involving powers of attorney is
too infrequent and too fact-specific. State legislatures should
therefore respond with legislation that fleshes out the skeleton of
this device, which was first constructed by the Virginia statute and
the UPC. The elements of a comprehensive definition of fidu-
ciary-vulnerability of the principal and the vertical distribution of
power, consent by the fiduciary, and the need for fiduciary rules to
replace monitoring function so that the arrangement can operate
efficiently without government intrusion 19-need to be considered
when determining how far the duties and liability extend over the
action and nonaction of an attorney-in-fact.
The fiduciary responsibilities of an attorney-in-fact for an
incapacitated principal should be high, in light of the broad power
wielded by the attorney-in-fact. 2 9 The first issue to tackle is the
318 E.g., McGovern, supra note 16, at 23 (stating courts will make exception to general
rules of agency when principal becomes incompetent).
"' See supra notes 90-104 and accompanying text (describing traditional categories of
fiduciaries and their varying duties).
' If the strictness of the duty is keyed to the extent of risk of the entrustor, then an
attorney-in-fact's duty would be at the highest level, because of the enormity of the power and
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fiduciary purpose: whether the fiduciary must act in accordance
with the principal's wishes or the principal's best interests.3 2' The
principal's wishes should be the starting point of the attorney-in-
fact's decisions because those intentions are akin to the purposes set
out in the trust agreement by the trustor or the testator in the will.
The source of the agent's authority is the principal. 22 For example,
the attorney-in-fact should not be faulted for maintaining the
principal's home-living situation, even though a supervised facility
would be more economical, if living at home was a strong desire of
the principal and that arrangement is economically feasible and safe
for the principal. On the other hand, the attorney-in-fact must be
able to interject his or her own judgment when the principal's
choices are potentially damaging. In that sense, the attorney-in-fact
is more like a guardian than a trustee, particularly where the
principal's judgment is impaired by the incapacity.
With respect to investments, the attorney-in-fact should be
obligated to follow prudent investment strategies determined in
light of the principal's age and financial situation. 23 A trustee is
usually allowed by statute to retain assets transferred to the trust
without consideration of the duty to diversify. 24 However, an
attorney-in-fact has authority over all of the principal's affairs and
allowing the attorney-in-fact to abdicate responsibility of investment
decisions by leaving the principal's choices intact, no matter how ill-
considered, would seem temptingly easy to the attorney-in-fact but
would be dangerous to the principal.
the absence ofmonitoring. See Frankel, supra note 189, at 1226 C'[B]ecause entrustors' risks
from the relationship may vary, fiduciary rules that address these risks vary.... ").
-2' One commentator, noting the gap between the traditional agency rule and the
situation of the attorney-in-fact for an incompetent principal, speculated that "[p]resumably,
courts will create an exception to the general rules of agency to cover such situations."
McGovern, supra note 16, at 23. Such a court-devised exception has not yet materialized,
however.
' See Mark Fowler, Note, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 985, 1025-26 (1984) (contrasting authority of agent with that of guardian,
whose authority comes from courts, which in turn have broad discretion to define guardian's
role).
s See Moses & Pope, supra note 310, at 521-22 (stating South Carolina statute classifies
attorneys-in-fact as fiduciaries; therefore, attorneys-in-fact are subject to state's statutory
prudent person investment rule).
34 See UNIF. TRUSTEES' POWERS ACT § 3(c)(1), 7C U.L.A. 401, 401 (2000).
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The agent's duty to follow the wishes of the principal raises
another problem. If the attorney-in-fact must be guided by the
principal's wishes as best ascertained, except in circumstances
where contrary actions would be in the principal's best interests,
then the attorney-in-fact is limited by two considerations rather
than one and must sometimes choose which controls. By contrast,
a trustee is relatively free to disregard the wishes of a beneficiary
if the trustee's actions are in the best interests of that beneficiary.
For example, a beneficiary may object to the trustee's investment in
companies the beneficiary does not consider socially responsible, but
as long as the investment is financially sound and within the
boundaries of the trust agreement, the trustee has not breached a
duty by making such investments. By contrast, if the attorney-in-
fact knows that the principal would disapprove of such investments,
then the attorney-in-fact may be breaching fiduciary duty by making
those investments." 5 Another example of an attorney-in-fact's
dilemma is the sale of real property to developers for significant
profit, when the principal made clear while competent that she
would never sell to developers. Again, a trustee may be free to act,
while an attorney-in-fact may be constrained by the wishes of the
principal.
It is difficult to pronounce a general rule for all attorneys-in-fact,
even if limited to attorneys-in-fact for incapacitated principals,
because the scope of the agent's authority may vary. The power of
attorney may be a general grant of authority, giving the attorney-in-
fact full authority to do everything that the principal could do with
respect to his property, or it may be limited to certain purposes. For
any limited purpose power of attorney, the specific duties of the
agent would have to be defined by the particular situation. A
statutory provision could therefore provide guidance by requiring an
attorney-in-fact to act in the best interests of the principal, in light
of the purpose of the agency relationship and consistent with the
principal's intentions when possible.
32 Hamann, supra note 296, at 29 ("Thus, if the attorney knows or has reason to know
that the principal would disapprove of a particular act, he may not perform that act, even
though it is ostensibly within the reach of his power of attorney.").
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Another concept in agency that creates some confusion when
applied to durable powers is that the principal is liable for contracts
of the agent.126 By contrast, the trust, but not the beneficiaries, is
liable for the trustee's contracts. 27 This feature of trusts is one of
its advantages: because the beneficiary has little control over the
trustee's actions (unlike a competent principal), the costs of the
beneficiary's monitoring of the trustee are reduced by the limit on
liability. 2' There has been some speculation that, because of the
similarities to trust beneficiaries, incompetent principals should in
some circumstances be able to void transactions entered into by the
attorney-in-fact on their behalf.129 However, the liability of the
principal for acts of the agent is an essential part of the durable
power of attorney scheme. If the transaction was subject to review
any time the principal was incapacitated, third parties would have
a strong disincentive to deal with attorneys-in-fact, and if third
parties refuse to accept the power of attorney, it is useless as a
planning tool.330 The principal's liability therefore plays a necessary
role and should be retained.
State statutes should have some procedure for the resignation of
an attorney-in-fact where the principal is incompetent. Without
such a procedure, the attorney-in-fact who wishes to resign must a
either make substitute arrangements privately or, if there are no
alternatives, petition the court for appointment of a guardian for the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 144 (1958).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 275 (1959).
See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 189, at 462-63 (noting trust beneficiary's lack of
liability is "efficient" and "minimize[s] the total costs of credit' and is therefore one of most
useful features of trusts).
m See McGovern, supra note 16, at 25 (suggesting third parties should not be able to hold
incompetent principal liable for unauthorized action of agent); Alexander M. Meiklejohn,
Incompetent Principals, Competent Third Parties, and the Law of Agency, 61 IND. L.J. 115,
147-48 (1986) (analogizing to cases involving acts of attorneys-in-fact under traditional powers
of attorney that were revoked upon principal's incapacity); see also Dessin, supra note 67, at
588-89 (noting transactional analysis of enforceability of attorney-in-faces contracts does not
adequately protect principal).
'a See McGovern, supra note 16, at 39-41 (describing current problem of third party
acceptance of power of attorney); see also Sandra G. Krawitz, The Florida Durable Power of
Attorney Becomes a Document to Respect-1995 Changes, 69 FLA. B.J. at 14 (Dec. 1995)
(noting "banks and other financial institutions have often rejected the present form of durable
power of attorney typically used in Florida, particularly where the attorney-in-fact is
attempting to transfer assets to a party other than the principal or the principal's trust").
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principal. Even where there is an alternate attorney-in-fact named
in the power of attorney who is willing to take over, the resigning
attorney-in-fact generally has no means to have his actions reviewed
and approved and could be answerable to the principal's executor or
administrator when the principal dies. A resignation procedure,
available to other fiduciaries,33" ' would make the position more
attractive to potential attorneys-in-fact.
Attorneys-in-fact should also be given some method of protecting
themselves against allegations of breach of fiduciary duty. The lack
of ongoing supervision means that an attorney-in-fact's actions may
never be reviewed and therefore are open to scrutiny and challenge
by the personal representative of the principal's estate. The
attorney-in-fact role would be more attractive if the statute allowed
the attorney-in-fact to petition the court for instructions or approval
of any transaction the attorney-in-fact was unsure about.
Also, if there was some access to the courts, there could be a
mechanism for approving self-dealing. For example, the principal's
financial situation may require that nonincome-producing assets be
sold, and a logical choice is recreational property, such as a vacation
cabin, that has been in the family for years but is no longer used by
the principal. The attorney-in-fact, child of the principal, is the only
family member who is financially able to purchase the property and
wants to purchase it to keep it in the family. The sale would be self-
dealing, however. Self-dealing transactions are allowed for most
fiduciaries if there is consent of interested parties or court
approval,33 2 but the attorney-in-fact cannot obtain the consent of an
incapacitated principal. A procedure to obtain court approval, with
notice to all other interested parties, would allow our attorney-in-
fact to keep the cabin in the family without risking a later lawsuit
by a disgruntled niece or nephew. The court access procedure could
be included in the same provisions, allowing an attorney-in-fact to
resign and allowing a third party to request an accounting from the
331 For examples of procedures allowing trustees to withdraw, see CAL. PROB. CODE §
17200 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.4106 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 555.25 (West 1988).
al See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 25, at 904-05.
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attorney-in-fact or other oversight of the attorney-in-fact's
activities. 
33
In summary, durable power of attorney reform needs to broaden
its scope beyond abuse prevention and remedy. The vast majority
of attorneys-in-fact carry out their duties faithfully,334 and those
attorneys-in-fact deserve a safe harbor from the abuse penalties and
from second guessing by other family members on how they resolve
the too numerous ambiguities associated with the role. Without a
corresponding clarification of the fiduciary duties, the pressure of
the abuse reforms will make the power of attorney too unattractive
to be useful, 335 and we will return to the situation of the early 1960's
where no legal device was available to deal efficiently with disability
planning.
Legislatures can attack abuse by oversight provisions and
enhanced penalties, if those provisions are mindful of retaining the
efficient use of the document without turning it into a de facto
guardianship and mindful of the well-meaning fiduciary. That well-
meaning fiduciary should be sufficiently comfortable with under-
standing the scope of duties so that she need not fear inadvertently
triggering the criminal penalties or loss of inheritance and other
punitive civil damages. That can be accomplished by clarifying the
scope of the attorney-in-fact's unique role and by clarifying that the
penalties are triggered only by intentional violation of duties. The
specific reforms should include some oversight mechanism, although
they must be carefully tailored so that the usefulness is not
undermined.
Duties of the attorney-in-fact that should be clarified start with
resolution of the fiduciary purpose. The attorney-in-fact should be
allowed to balance the principal's wishes with the principal's best
interests and should be given discretion to resolve conflicts between
the two. The attorney-in-fact's duty to act should be stated as a
duty only to continue whatever management the attorney-in-fact
has already undertaken, in other words, a duty not to abandon. The
"33See CAL. PROB. CODE § 4541 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001) (delineating purposes for which
petition may be filed).
a Schilling, supra note 2, at 250; English & Wolff, supra note 70, at 34.
See generally see Murphy, supra note 77 (describing Arizona's abuse reforms that have
made use of durable power of attorney less attractive).
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statutes should provide a resignation procedure so that an attorney-
in-fact who wishes to resign can do so without fear of future
liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
The need for the durable power of attorney, as identified over
thirty years ago, is greater than ever. It is time to recognize the
unique character of this fiduciary and construct guideposts to
continue the instrument's viability. Reform aimed at curbing abuse
of the document must be mindful of retaining its usefulness. In
turning attention to the durable power of attorney, our understand-
ing of the nature of a fiduciary can also be enhanced. The durable
power of attorney illustrates that the fiduciary's needs and limita-
tions on carrying out the fiduciary purpose must be considered when
specifying the role. It also indicates a purpose of having a fiduciary
category of relationships: certain relationships necessary to the
community cannot be efficiently regulated by the self-interested
marketplace or the government. Those relationships function best
without monitoring from those sectors, and the fiduciary principle
gives them a non-intrusive enforcement mechanism from the courts.
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